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1461 
THE CLASS ACTION AS TRUST 
Sergio J. Campos* 
Abstract: The class action is controversial because the class attorney can litigate or settle 
the claims of the class members without their consent. Many scholars have turned to 
corporate law to address the potentially disloyal behavior of the class attorney. These 
scholars have used analogies to corporate law to support (1) the use of opt-out rights and (2) 
restrictions on class conflicts to constrain class attorneys, and the law has generally mirrored 
both requirements. In practice, however, both of these requirements have undermined the 
efficacy of the class action and prevented the class action from being used in many 
appropriate settings. 
This Article argues that a more useful model for the class action is the trust. Unlike the 
shareholders of a corporation, the beneficiaries of the trust typically cannot exercise control 
over the trustee. Moreover, unlike the corporation, trust law facilitates the creation of trusts 
with conflicts among the beneficiaries. These features of the trust mirror the most 
controversial features of the class action. 
The Article shows that both of these features are necessary to address problems of scale 
found in both contexts. Unlike in the corporate context, both the trust and class action 
contexts lack a well-developed market for managerial control which would allow 
beneficiaries/class members with conflicting interests to cede control to a third party with 
better aligned interests. In the absence of such a market, retaining control among the divided 
beneficiaries/class members prevents them from investing in the res/claims at the right scale. 
Accordingly, trust law shows that class action requirements such as opt-out rights and 
class cohesion are misguided. The article concludes by applying the trust model of the class 
action to such class action issues as the ascertainability of class members, settlement pressure 
on the defendants, and cy pres awards. 
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INTRODUCTION 
The class action is one of the most controversial procedures in civil 
litigation.1 This is because the class action allows the class attorney to 
litigate and settle the claims of the class members without their consent.2 
Courts and scholars have expressed concern that the class attorney may 
enter into suboptimal settlements to the detriment of the class members3 
or fail to treat the individual class members fairly.4 
                                                     
1. Ryan C. Williams, Due Process, Class Action Opt Outs, and the Right Not to Sue, 115 COLUM. 
L. REV. 599, 635 (2015) (“It is no secret that class actions are deeply controversial.”).  
2. See Eubank v. Pella Corp., 753 F.3d 718, 719 (7th Cir. 2014) (noting that the class action “is 
controversial and embattled” because “[t]he control of the class over its lawyers usually is 
attenuated, often to the point of nonexistence”); John C. Coffee, Jr., Conflicts, Consent, and 
Allocation After Amchem Products—Or, Why Attorneys Still Need Consent to Give Away Their 
Clients’ Money, 84 VA. L. REV. 1541, 1549–50 (1998); Martin H. Redish & Julie M. Karaba, One 
Size Doesn’t Fit All: Multidistrict Litigation, Due Process, and the Dangers of Procedural 
Collectivism, 95 B.U. L. REV. 109, 110 (2015) (“Both courts and scholars have expressed concern 
about what they see as the pathologies of the modern class action, among which is the threat posed 
by the controversial procedure to the constitutionally protected interests of those passive 
claimants.”); cf. Howard M. Erichson & Benjamin C. Zipursky, Consent Versus Closure, 96 
CORNELL L. REV. 265, 313 (2011) (arguing against advance consent to settle a claim in aggregate 
settlements because “[w]hether to develop or use that claim at all is, of course, the individual’s 
choice”). 
3. Bruce Hay & David Rosenberg, “Sweetheart” and “Blackmail” Settlements in Class Actions: 
Reality and Remedy, 75 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1377, 1390–91 (2000) (discussing sweetheart 
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Many scholars have looked to the law of corporations to address the 
potential for abuse by the class attorney. Some scholars have directly 
analogized the class action to a corporation or similar entity.5 Others 
have used the literature on agency costs in corporate law.6 Generally, 
these scholars have argued in favor of opt-out rights for class members 
in class actions involving damage claims. Analogizing the class 
members to the shareholders in a corporation, they have argued that opt-
                                                     
settlements). This concern with class attorneys selling out the class has a long history. See 
Alleghany Corp. v. Kirby, 333 F.2d 327, 347 (2d Cir. 1964) (Friendly, J., dissenting) (noting that a 
class attorney may have an incentive to accept a suboptimal settlement, stating that “a juicy bird in 
the hand is worth more than the vision of a much larger one in the bush, attainable only after years 
of effort not currently compensated and possibly a mirage”). 
4. Amchem Prods., Inc. v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 591, 626 (1997) (rejecting class action settlement 
of asbestos claims because “the interests of those within the single class are not aligned”); see also 
Samuel Issacharoff & Richard A. Nagareda, Class Settlements Under Attack, 156 U. PA. L. REV. 
1649, 1684 (2008) (arguing that class actions should not be certified where there are conflicts which 
“give rise to a significant potential for negotiation on behalf of an undifferentiated class to skew in 
some predictable way the design of class-settlement terms in favor of one or another subgroup for 
reasons unrelated to evaluation of the relevant claims”). 
5. David L. Shapiro, Class Actions: The Class as Party and Client, 73 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 913, 
921 (1998) (presenting an “entity” theory of the class action which analogizes the class action to 
“congregations, trade unions, joint stock companies, corporations . . . municipalities and other 
governmental entities”); see also Samuel Issacharoff, Class Actions and State Authority, 44 LOY. U. 
CHI. L.J. 369, 385 (2012) [hereinafter Issacharoff, State Authority] (analogizing the class action to 
the Venetian commenda, “a rudimentary type of joint stock company, which formed only for the 
duration of a single trading mission” (quoting DARON ACEMOGLU & JAMES A. ROBINSON, WHY 
NATIONS FAIL: THE ORIGINS OF POWER, PROSPERITY, AND POVERTY 152 (2012))). The class action 
has also been analogized to a sovereign state. See Samuel Issacharoff, Governance and Legitimacy 
in the Law of Class Actions, 1999 SUP. CT. REV. 337, 338 [hereinafter Issacharoff, Governance] 
(“[I]t is useful to think of the class action mechanism as fundamentally a centralizing device 
designed to accomplish some of the same functions as performed by the state.”).  
6. The scholar most associated with using the agency cost literature in the corporate law context 
to examine the class action is John Coffee, Jr., whose class action scholarship has been enormously 
influential. See John C. Coffee, Jr., Class Action Accountability: Reconciling Exit, Voice, and 
Loyalty in Representative Litigation, 100 COLUM. L. REV. 370, 377 (2000) [hereinafter Coffee, 
Accountability] (noting that “the academic literature on complex litigation has not analyzed class 
actions in these agency cost terms”); John C. Coffee Jr., The Regulation of Entrepreneurial 
Litigation: Balancing Fairness and Efficiency in the Large Class Action, 54 U. CHI. L. REV. 877, 
883 (1987) [hereinafter Coffee, Regulation] (“It is no secret that substantial conflicts of interest 
between attorney and client can arise in class action litigation. In the language of economics, this is 
an ‘agency cost’ problem.”). Others have also analyzed the class action in agency cost terms, most 
notably Jonathan Macey and Geoffrey Miller, although Macey and Miller do not analogize the class 
action to the corporation. See Jonathan R. Macey & Geoffrey P. Miller, The Plaintiffs’ Attorney’s 
Role in Class Action and Derivative Litigation: Economic Analysis and Recommendations for 
Reform, 58 U. CHI. L. REV. 1, 12 (1991) (citing Michael C. Jensen & William H. Meckling, Theory 
of the Firm: Managerial Behavior, Agency Costs and Ownership Structure, 3 J. FIN. ECON. 305 
(1976)) (“The lawyer’s role as agent of the client can be analyzed from an economic perspective 
with modern tools of agency cost theory”). Indeed, this Article does not criticize the use of the 
agency cost literature per se, but the use of corporate analogies based on this literature. 
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out rights allow class members to assert some control over their claims, 
and thus provide a check against a potentially disloyal class attorney.7 
They have also argued in favor of avoiding significant class conflicts to 
prevent unfair treatment of some class members over others.8 The law 
on class actions has generally mirrored the proposed reforms of these 
corporate law-influenced scholars, requiring opt-out rights for damage 
class actions9 and that such class actions can only be certified if the class 
is “sufficiently cohesive.”10 
The turn to corporate law, particularly its literature on agency costs, 
has significantly influenced class action scholarship.11 In fact, the 
                                                     
7. The scholar most associated with using corporate law to advocate for opt-out rights is John 
Coffee, Jr. See John C. Coffee, Jr., Litigation Governance: Taking Accountability Seriously, 110 
COLUM. L. REV. 288, 308–09 (2010) [hereinafter Coffee, Governance] (analogizing opt-out rights 
to the selling of shares in the corporate context, arguing that they may be a “powerful tool in 
litigation governance”); JOHN C. COFFEE JR., ENTREPRENEURIAL LITIGATION: ITS RISE, FALL, AND 
FUTURE 83 (2015) [hereinafter COFFEE, ENTREPRENEURIAL LITIGATION] (arguing that “increased 
opting out benefits all plaintiffs because it may constitute an effective accountability mechanism by 
which class members can discipline their counsel”); Coffee, Accountability, supra note 6, at 419 
(arguing for “enhancing the right to exit” to check the loyalty of the class attorney); John C. Coffee, 
Jr., Class Wars: The Dilemma of the Mass Tort Class Action, 95 COLUM. L. REV. 1343, 1447, 1465 
(1995) [hereinafter Coffee, Class Wars] (stressing the importance of the right to opt out in mass tort 
cases).  
8. Coffee, Accountability, supra note 6, at 435 (arguing that “a more rigorous definition of class 
cohesion should apply in the case of the mandatory class action where the class member is 
essentially being coerced into participation”); see also Issacharoff, Governance, supra note 5, at 385 
(using a governance model to argue for a modified cohesion, noting that “[t]he key is that a 
supervising court must be assured at the threshold stage of the litigation that there are no structural 
allegiances of class counsel that would create incentives to favor one part of the class over another, 
or be biased against seeking the best possible return to a defined subset of claims”).  
9.  See FED. R. CIV. P. 23(b)(3), 23(c)(2)(B) (providing that for classes certified under 23(b)(3), 
“the court must direct to class members the best notice that is practicable under the circumstances”); 
Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 564 U.S. 338, 362 (2011) (concluding that “individualized 
monetary claims belong in Rule 23(b)(3)” because of the “procedural protections attending the 
(b)(3) class—predominance, superiority, mandatory notice, and the right to opt out” (emphasis 
added)). 
10. The insistence on class cohesions stems from the Supreme Court’s review of comprehensive 
class action settlements of asbestos claims in the 1990s. See Amchem Prods., Inc. v. Windsor, 521 
U.S. 591, 623 (1997) (noting that the federal class action rule, Rule 23, tests “whether proposed 
classes are sufficiently cohesive to warrant adjudication by representation”). The requirement has 
been emphasized in recent cases. See, e.g., Amgen, Inc. v. Conn. Ret. Plans & Trust Funds, 
__ U.S. __, 133 S. Ct. 1184, 1196–97 (2013) (noting that “the focus of the predominance inquiry 
under Rule 23(b)(3)” is whether “a proposed class is ‘sufficiently cohesive to warrant adjudication 
by representation’” (citing Amchem, 521 U.S. at 623)); Comcast Corp. v. Behrend, __ U.S. __, 133 
S. Ct. 1426, 1436 (2012) (same). 
11. See Myriam Gilles & Gary B. Friedman, Exploding the Class Action Agency Costs Myth: The 
Social Utility of Entrepreneurial Lawyers, 155 U. PA. L. REV. 103, 113 (2006) (noting that, due to 
the work of Coffee, as well as Macey and Miller, “in legal academia, the dominant story was agency 
costs”); William B. Rubenstein, On What A “Private Attorney General” Is—And Why It Matters, 57 
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American Law Institute’s recent Principles of the Law of Aggregate 
Litigation uses the agency cost literature in the corporate context both to 
support opt-out rights in class actions involving damage claims and to 
recommend against the certification of such class actions when 
“structural conflicts” exist.12 
However, these reforms have had disastrous results for class actions 
involving damage claims. Even supporters of opt-out rights have 
conceded that such rights can cause collective action problems, which 
undermine beneficial settlements.13 Moreover, the class cohesion 
requirement has made it difficult to certify even litigation involving 
small claims because in many cases, the claims lack “some glue 
holding” them together.14 This is ironic because the Supreme Court has 
stated that “[t]he policy at the very core of the class action mechanism is 
to overcome the problem that small recoveries do not provide the 
incentive for any individual to bring a solo action prosecuting his or her 
rights.”15 
In analyzing the agency costs that may arise between the class 
attorney and the class members, scholars have ignored the trust and its 
                                                     
VAND. L. REV. 2129, 2161–62 (2004) (noting that “in the past twenty years, scholars loosely 
associated with the law and economics movement—most centrally, Professor John Coffee—have 
sketched a competing portrayal of class counsel” as profit-driven and that “the problem presented 
by entrepreneurial lawyering can be understood in terms of agency costs”). 
12. PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF AGGREGATE LITIGATION § 1.05 reporters’ notes cmt. a (AM. LAW 
INST. 2010) [hereinafter ALI, PRINCIPLES] (noting that “[t]his Section addresses the problem of 
agency failure in aggregate proceedings by establishing adequate representation as a goal and by 
identifying tools that can be used to help ensure it,” citing literature on the agency costs of corporate 
control); id. § 1.05(c)(7) & cmt. j (arguing that class members should have a right to opt out to allow 
“escape from unwanted representation”); id. § 2.07(a)(1) (stating that, to protect the rights of 
individual class members, a court should determine that “there are no structural conflicts of 
interest”); id. § 2.07 cmt. c (supporting restrictions on “structural conflicts” by stating that “[w]ithin 
corporations, for example, shareholders may sell their shares (an exit right), participate in corporate 
governance (a voice right), or leave the management of the corporation to various agents obliged to 
advance corporate interests rather than their own (a loyalty right). As elaborated in the Comments 
that follow, aggregate litigation by way of a class action calls for an analogous array of 
rights . . . .”). 
13. See RICHARD A. NAGAREDA, MASS TORTS IN A WORLD OF SETTLEMENT 143–47 (2007) 
(noting that the inclusion of back-end opt outs in a global settlement of fen-phen claims resulted in 
an unraveling of the settlement); Alexandra D. Lahav, The Case for “Trial by Formula,” 90 TEX. L. 
REV. 571, 622 (2012) (noting that opt-out rights for class actions with high variance claims result in 
“adverse selection” which may unravel the class). 
14. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 564 U.S. at 339 (vacating certification of class action of female 
employees with small claims asserted against Wal-Mart). 
15. Amchem, 521 U.S. at 617 (quoting Mace v. Van Ru Credit Corp., 109 F.3d 338, 344 (7th Cir. 
1997)).  
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unique features.16 In part this is because scholars have tended to lump 
together all organizational forms that separate ownership and control 
rights.17 Moreover, the scholars who have applied the corporate law 
literature on agency costs to the class action context are also corporate 
law scholars.18 Finally, the trust has only recently been subject to 
functional analysis by scholars.19 
But in ignoring the trust, scholars have overlooked a more analogous 
organizational form to the class action. For example, although scholars 
and courts have bemoaned the lack of direct control the class members 
can exercise over the class attorney, a similar lack of direct control is a 
defining feature of the trust.20 This lack of direct control distinguishes 
the trust from the corporation, which allows shareholders to choose 
corporate directors and officers.21 In addition, despite the prohibition on 
conflicts among class members, conflicts are pervasive in all class 
                                                     
16. Apart from my own work, the only exception is Martin Redish and Megan Kiernan, who have 
analogized the class action to a trust, but only for the limited purpose of preclusion. See Martin H. 
Redish & Megan B. Kiernan, Avoiding Death by a Thousand Cuts: The Relitigation of Class 
Certification and the Realities of the Modern Class Action, 99 IOWA L. REV. 1659, 1676–77 (2014) 
(discussing the “limited nature” of their model). 
17. See, e.g., ALI, PRINCIPLES, supra note 12, § 1.05 reporters’ notes cmt. a (referring to “the 
economic literature on agency relationships” without distinguishing among different relationships). 
18. For example, along with his work on class actions, John C. Coffee has written extensively on 
corporate law, including serving as a reporter for the American Law Institute’s Principles of 
Corporate Governance. See PRINCIPLES OF CORP. GOVERNANCE: ANALYSIS & RECOMMENDATIONS 
(AM. LAW INST., Tentative Draft No. 3, 1984). Jonathan Macey and Geoffrey Miller have also 
written extensively on corporate law. See, e.g., ROBERT W. HAMILTON, JONATHAN R. MACEY & 
DOUGLAS K. MOLL, THE LAW OF BUSINESS ORGANIZATIONS: CASES, MATERIALS, AND PROBLEMS 
(12th ed. 2014); GEOFFREY PARSONS MILLER, THE LAW OF GOVERNANCE, RISK MANAGEMENT, 
AND COMPLIANCE (2014).  
19. See, e.g., Henry Hansmann & Ugo Mattei, The Functions of Trust Law: A Comparative Legal 
and Economic Analysis, 73 N.Y.U. L. REV. 434 (1998); Daniel B. Kelly, Toward Economic 
Analysis of the Uniform Probate Code, 45 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 855 (2012); John H. Langbein, 
The Contractarian Basis of the Law of Trusts, 105 YALE L.J. 625 (1995); Robert H. Sitkoff, An 
Agency Costs Theory of Trust Law, 89 CORNELL L. REV. 621 (2004).  
20. Admittedly, the terms of the trust instrument may permit the beneficiaries to exercise direct 
control over the trustee. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 14B cmt. b (AM. LAW INST. 
1958). However, as a default, beneficiaries cannot exercise control over the trustee, and “the trustee 
is not ordinarily subject to the control of the beneficiary.” WILLIAM T. ALLEN & REINIER 
KRAAKMAN, COMMENTARIES AND CASES ON THE LAW OF BUSINESS ORGANIZATION § 2.3.3, at 36 
(2003). 
21. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 14C cmt. a (AM. LAW INST. 1958) (noting that the 
board of directors of a corporation is subject to the control of the shareholders “with regard to the 
appointment and removal of its members. Directors are elected by the stockholders, who can refuse 
to re-elect them at the end of their terms of office and, in certain circumstances, can remove them 
prior thereto.”). 
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actions,22 and unlike corporate law, trust law uniquely facilitates the 
creation and maintenance of trusts with beneficiaries who have 
conflicting interests.23 These shared features of the class action and the 
trust provide a clue that the trust, rather than the corporation, may serve 
as a more useful model for the class action. 
This Article looks to the trust as a guide for understanding and 
reforming the class action.24 Admittedly, the trust and the class action 
differ in important ways. The trust comes into being by a private party, 
the settlor, while the class action is judicially created. Moreover, there is 
no analogue for the defendant in the trust context. Nevertheless, the trust 
is useful for designing the class action because the features they do share 
are necessary to address a problem commonly found in both contexts. 
Although controversial, it is generally understood that the class action 
addresses a problem of scale. One “policy at the very core of the class 
action mechanism” is to enable litigation involving numerous small 
claims against a single defendant, where the individual claimants lack an 
incentive to bring their small claims at all.25 The claimants would have 
an incentive to bring an action if they could share the costs of 
investments in common issues, thereby using economies of scale to 
make litigation worthwhile.26 However, the claimants fail to do so 
                                                     
22. Jay Tidmarsh, Rethinking Adequacy of Representation, 87 TEX. L. REV. 1137, 1139 (2009) 
(noting that “the reasons that class actions are thought to be necessary invariably generate the very 
conflicts of interest, either among class members or between class members and class counsel, that 
the traditional view of adequate representation forbids”). 
23. Sitkoff, supra note 19, at 650–51 (noting that, unlike corporate law and other forms of 
organizational law, “[t]rust law facilitates the creation of residual claimants with interests adverse to 
each other” and imposes a unique “duty of impartiality” on trustees to account for these interests); 
see also Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel, Voting in Corporate Law, 26 J.L. & ECON. 395, 
405 (1983) (“The preferences of one class of participants are likely to be similar if not identical [in 
corporations]. This is true of shareholders especially, for people buy and sell in the market so that 
the shareholders of a given firm at a given time are a reasonably homogeneous group with respect to 
their desires for the firm.”). 
24. Here I build on my previous work analogizing the class action to a trust. See Sergio J. 
Campos, Class Actions and Justiciability, 66 FLA. L. REV. 553, 565–74 (2014) [hereinafter Campos, 
Justiciability]; Sergio J. Campos, Mass Torts and Due Process, 65 VAND. L. REV. 1059, 1077–79 
(2012) [hereinafter Campos, Mass Torts]; Sergio J. Campos, Proof of Classwide Injury, 37 BROOK. 
J. INT’L L. 751, 772, 775–77 (2012) [hereinafter Campos, Proof].  
25. Amchem Prods., Inc. v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 591, 617 (1997) (quoting Mace v. Van Ru Credit 
Corp., 109 F.3d 338, 344 (7th Cir. 1997)). This Article focuses on class actions for damages, which 
are typically certified under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(b)(3). However, many of the 
arguments made here extend to other types of class actions as well, which this Article will discuss 
intermittently in the text.  
26. Campos, Mass Torts, supra note 24, at 1074–76 (discussing the problem of asymmetric 
stakes, or scale, in small claims litigation). The scale problem was first introduced by David 
Rosenberg in his work on mass tort litigation. For a recent examination by Rosenberg of the 
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because of collective action problems.27 Moreover, a third party cannot 
acquire the claims in a market and thereby acquire the requisite incentive 
to invest at the right scale.28 
The class action solves this problem by assigning control over the 
claims to a third party, the class attorney, who is incentivized to sue 
because her compensation is typically based on the class’s recovery as a 
whole.29 Thus, the class attorney, unlike the class members, takes 
control over the claims because she can invest in common issues at the 
right scale. 
The trust addresses a functionally identical problem of scale in many 
typical settings.30 Trusts are generally created to manage property, the 
res, for beneficiaries who lack the ability or motivation to dispose of the 
property on their own.31 Trusts are commonly used when, in the absence 
of the trust, conflicting interests would prevent beneficiaries from 
pursuing investment opportunities that increase the res as a whole. In a 
common example, one beneficiary may have an interest in the income of 
a res while another may have a remainder interest in the principal.32 In 
such trusts, the conflicting interests of the beneficiaries may prevent 
such persons, in the absence of the trust, from pursuing investment 
opportunities that would make them both better off but would make one 
worse off, such as by depleting the principal to increase income.33 
                                                     
problem of scale in small claims and similar litigation, see David Rosenberg & Kathryn E. Spier, 
Incentives to Invest in Litigation and the Superiority of the Class Action, 6 J. LEG. ANALYSIS 305, 
305–06 (2014) (arguing that class action treatment is preferable when the plaintiffs are numerous 
but their claims share common issues of law and fact). 
27. Campos, Mass Torts, supra note 24, at 1074–76. 
28. See infra section I.A.1 (discussing restrictions on the alienability of claims, such as champerty 
and maintenance). 
29. See infra section I.B.3. 
30. See infra section I.B.2. 
31. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 27 cmt. 2(b)(1) (AM. LAW INST. 2001) (noting that a 
“common motivation[]” for using a trust is “to provid[e] property management for those who 
cannot, ought not, or wish not to manage for themselves”). 
32. AMY MORRIS HESS ET AL., BOGERT’S TRUSTS AND TRUSTEES § 816 (3d ed. 2013) (“Almost 
every trustee finds that the trust terms require him to pay or apply ‘income’ to or for a temporary 
beneficiary, and to distribute ‘principal’ to one or more beneficiaries prior to or upon termination of 
the trust . . . .”); see also Reid Kress Weisbord, The Advisory Function of Law, 90 TUL. L. REV. 129, 
181 (2015) (discussing the “common example in which a trust provides income to the settlor’s 
surviving spouse for life, followed by income to the settlor’s children for their lives, followed by 
outright distribution of the remaining assets to the settlor’s grandchildren”); Sitkoff, supra note 19, 
at 650 (“The still classic example . . . is a trust for the lifetime income benefit of one party (B1) with 
the remainder principal benefit to another (B2) . . . .”).  
33. See Dennis v. R.I. Hosp. Trust Nat’l Bank, 744 F.2d 893, 897 (1st Cir. 1984) (concluding that 
a trustee breached fiduciary duty of impartiality to income and principal beneficiaries by failing to 
maintain buildings “to make larger income payments during the life of the trust,” noting that “[i]n a 
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Moreover, like in the class action, there is no well-developed market for 
the beneficiaries’ shares that would allow a third party to acquire control 
over both shares to invest at the right scale.34 Thus, trust law resolves 
this problem of scale by allowing the trustee to focus on the total returns 
of the res as a whole35 and equitably distribute the gains,36 making both 
beneficiaries better off.37 
Given their functional similarity with regard to the problem of scale, 
the trust can serve as a resource in designing and reforming the class 
action. Trust law has the further advantage of providing an existing and 
well-developed body of law which can be drawn upon in the class action 
context. Indeed, trust law utilizes many controversial features of class 
actions to solve the problem of scale, showing that these features are not 
                                                     
sense, the payments ate away the trust’s capital”); Weisbord, supra note 32, at 181 (discussing this 
tension, noting that the income beneficiaries “would prefer the trust corpus to be invested in 
income-producing assets” while the principal beneficiaries “would prefer the trust corpus to be 
invested in equities of firms likely to realize long-term capital appreciation, such as growth stocks”). 
34. For example, spendthrift trusts, which prohibit a beneficiary from alienating his or her 
beneficial interest in the res, “and similar asset protection devices command huge amounts of capital 
in modern America.” See Joshua Getzler, Transplantation and Mutation in Anglo-American Trust 
Law, 10 THEORETICAL INQUIRIES IN L. 355, 360 (2009). In fact, spendthrift trusts are the default 
form of trust in some states. See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 12, § 3536(a) (West 2016); N.Y. EST. 
POWERS & TRUSTS L. § 7-1.5 (McKinney 1967) (with respect to income only); see also JESSE 
DUKEMINIER, ROBERT H. SITKOFF, & JAMES LINDGREN, WILLS, TRUSTS, AND ESTATES 695 & n.18 
(9th ed. 2013) (citing these two statutes as examples of laws which make trusts presumptively 
spendthrift). Given the proliferation of spendthrift trusts and other “doctrinal impediments designed 
to give effect to the settlor’s dead-hand interests,” it is no surprise that there is a “lack of a thick 
secondary market for trust residual claims.” Robert H. Sitkoff, Trust Law, Corporate Law, and 
Capital Market Efficiency, 28 J. CORP. L. 565, 566 (2003).  
35. See UNIF. PRUDENT INV’R ACT §§ 2–3 (1994) (permitting trustee to invest so as to focus on 
the total return on the trust property); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS: PRUDENT INV’R RULE 
§ 227(a) (AM. LAW INST. 1992) (same). 
36. UNIF. PRINCIPAL & INCOME ACT § 104(a) & cmt. (NAT’L CONFERENCE OF COMM’RS 1997) 
(providing that “[a] trustee may adjust between principal and income to the extent the trustee 
considers necessary if the trustee invests and manages trust assets as a prudent investor,” and noting 
that “[t]he purpose of Section 104 is to enable a trustee to select investments based on the standards 
of a prudent investor without having to realize a particular portion of the portfolio’s total return in 
the form of traditional trust accounting income such as interest and dividends”); see also 
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 111(b) (AM. LAW INST. 2012) (requiring a trustee to “make an 
equitable adjustment, except as preempted or precluded by statute, or as limited by the terms, 
objectives, or circumstances of the trust” if necessary to comply with duty of impartiality as to 
principal and income beneficiaries). 
37. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 111 cmt. a (AM. LAW INST. 2012) (noting that “[i]t is 
normally advantageous to beneficiaries collectively and therefore prudent for the trustee to seek a 
total return that is optimal in light of the trust’s purposes and circumstances,” and thus, in a trust 
with both income and principal beneficiaries, “[t]he ideal way of reconciling . . . potentially 
conflicting responsibilities . . . is to invest for optimal total return and, if necessary, to adjust 
principal and income”). 
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as unfamiliar, and therefore should not be as “extraordinary,” as courts 
and scholars frequently assume.38 
As I argue below, using the trust as a guide for class actions has two 
important payoffs. First, it shows that protecting class member control 
over the claims, such as through an opt-out right, is self-defeating. The 
fatal flaw of analogizing the class action to the corporation is that, unlike 
in the corporate context, there is no third-party market for the class 
members’ claims which would allow control rights to be acquired 
privately at the right scale. As a result, preserving the class members’ 
control over their claims only reintroduces the collective action 
problems that caused suboptimal investment in the claims in the first 
place.39 
Second, by looking to trust law, one sees that the insistence on class 
cohesion is not only unnecessary, but harmful. Conflicts among the 
beneficiaries are a common cause of the problem of scale both trusts and 
class actions address. Indeed the trust, unlike the corporation, accounts 
for conflicts among the beneficiaries for this reason. Accordingly, 
insisting on class cohesion would close off the class action to the very 
situations where it would most be useful, such as in mass tort 
litigation.40 Moreover, the model shows that collective procedures such 
as bifurcation and damage scheduling are not only common in the trust 
context, but actually prevent the unfair treatment of beneficiaries.41 
Thus, such procedures should be permitted in class actions. 
The usefulness of the trust to class action law also extends beyond the 
relationship between the class attorney and the class members. Here I 
utilize trust law to address a broad range of class action issues, such as 
the ascertainability of class members,42 whether class actions impose 
undue settlement pressure on defendants,43 and the availability of cy pres 
distribution to third parties.44 
Part I sets forth why the trust can be useful for understanding and 
reforming the class action. Part II uses the model to show that neither 
                                                     
38. Cf. Theodore Eisenberg & Stephen C. Yeazell, The Ordinary and the Extraordinary in 
Institutional Litigation, 93 HARV. L. REV. 465, 466 (1980) (arguing that then-recent institutional 
reform litigation was not “extraordinary” given “the willingness of past and contemporary courts to 
supervise complex institutions” in ordinary litigation).  
39. See infra section II.A.1. 
40. See infra section II.B.1. 
41. See infra sections II.B.2 & II.B.3. 
42. See infra section III.A. 
43. See infra section III.B. 
44. See infra section III.C. 
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opt-out rights nor class cohesion should be required to certify a class 
action. Part III concludes by extending the model to consider other 
controversial issues in class action law. 
I. THE MODEL 
A. Background 
The trust model of the class action proposed in this article is based on 
an analogy between the relevant parties and property of the trust and of 
the class action. Specifically: 
 
• the class members’ claims are analogous to the res; 
• the class members are analogous to the beneficiaries; 
and 
• the class action attorney can be understood as a trustee 
over the claims for the benefit of the class members. 
 
Because the model is based on a correspondence between the relevant 
persons and property found in both the class action and trust contexts, it 
is useful to define generic terms for instances when I want to refer to 
both at the same time. Thus, I will use the term “managed property” to 
refer to both the res and the class members’ claims; the term “recipients” 
to refer to both the beneficiaries of the trust and the class members; and 
the term “manager” to refer to both the trustee and the class attorney.45 
Because I am focusing on the rights and duties of the class attorneys 
with respect to the class members, I do not discuss the settlor in the core 
model, who admittedly plays an essential role in trust law,46 but as noted 
earlier, does not have an exact analogue in the class action context.47 
Despite this difference between the class action and the trust, I argue 
below that the trust can still be a useful guide, or model, in examining 
the function of the class action. 
                                                     
45. See Hansmann & Mattei, supra note 19, at 439 (using the same terms “for 
the . . . characteristic parties” and property in trusts and trust-like relationships). 
46. See Sitkoff, supra note 19, at 643 (“The settlor’s intent to create a trust is a prerequisite to 
trust formation.”). I respond to potential objections to the lack of a settlor analogue below. See infra 
section I.A.3. 
47. Nevertheless, in discussing applications of the model, I do discuss the court as a type of “trust 
protector” that, like the settlor, can be understood as concerned with the enforcement of the terms of 
the trust. See infra section II.A.3. For that reason, I discuss the role of the settlor in the background 
section on trusts. See infra section I.A.2. 
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But before looking to trust law as a guide for the law of class actions, 
some basic background on class actions and trusts is necessary. 
1. Class Actions 
There are many types of class actions and similar aggregate 
procedures.48 This article focuses on federal damages class actions 
governed under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(b)(3). It does so 
because Rule 23(b)(3) class actions are the most controversial use of the 
class action, and thus most clearly demonstrate the controversial features 
of the class action.49 
In general, Rule 23 provides that “one or more members of a class 
may sue or be sued as representative parties on behalf of all class 
members” if certain requirements are met.50 A party seeking class 
certification must first show that: (1) the class is “numerous”; (2) “there 
are questions of law or fact common to the class”; (3) the representative 
party is “typical” of the class; and (4) the representative party “will fairly 
and adequately protect the interests of the class.”51 These four 
prerequisites, commonly referred to as numerosity, commonality, 
typicality, and adequacy of representation, respectively, must be 
satisfied for certification of all proposed class actions. An additional 
“adequacy of representation” requirement applies to the attorney 
representing the class.52 
In addition to the above prerequisites, the party “must satisfy at least 
one of the three requirements listed in Rule 23(b).”53 Rule 23(b)(3), the 
focus of this article, defines a residual category of permissible class 
actions that typically applies to litigation involving monetary remedies.54 
                                                     
48. For a discussion of various aggregate procedures, see ALI, PRINCIPLES, supra note 12, § 1.02. 
Examples of these procedures include: (1) consolidated proceedings; (2) multidistrict litigation; and 
(3) bankruptcy proceedings. See 28 U.S.C. § 1407 (2012); FED. R. CIV. P. 42(a); FED. R. BANKR. 
7001. 
49. Campos, Mass Torts, supra note 24, at 1088 (taking a similar approach). 
50. FED. R. CIV. P. 23(a).  
51. Id. 23(a)(1)–(4). 
52. Id. 23(g)(2) (“When one applicant seeks appointment as class counsel, the court may appoint 
that applicant only if the applicant is adequate under Rule 23(g)(1) and (4).”); id. 23(g)(4) (“Class 
counsel must fairly and adequately represent the interests of the class.”). 
53. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 564 U.S. 338, 345 (2011); see also FED. R. CIV. P. 23(b)(1)–
(3). 
54. See Amendments to Rules of Civil Procedure Supplemental Rules for Certain Admiralty & 
Mar. Claims Rules of Criminal Procedure, 39 F.R.D. 69, 103 (1966) (discussing creation of Rule 
23(b)(3) category); Benjamin Kaplan, A Prefatory Note, 10 B.C. INDUS. & COM. L. REV. 497, 497 
(1969) (noting that the 1966 amendments that created Rule 23(b)(3) for damage class actions are the 
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Rule 23(b)(3) permits a class action only if it is shown that (1) common 
questions “predominate over any questions affecting only individual 
members” (the “predominance” requirement) and (2) the “class action is 
superior to other available methods” (the “superiority” requirement).55 
Rule 23(b)(3) class actions are typically certified for litigation 
involving claims that are too small to be brought individually. Indeed, 
the Rule 23(b)(3) category was created precisely to vindicate “the rights 
of groups of people who individually would be without effective 
strength to bring their opponents into court at all.”56 However, Rule 
23(b)(3) class actions are also certified for litigation involving large 
claims, such as in securities fraud and antitrust litigation.57 
Rule 23(b)(3) class actions are controversial primarily because, as in 
all class actions, the class attorney’s development and disposition of the 
claims are not subject to the direct selection or control of the class 
members. Upon certification of the class action by the judge, the class 
attorney, in effect, can seek a judgment that binds all of the class 
members without their consent. That is why the class action is 
considered a “recognized exception” to the “principle of general 
application in Anglo-American jurisprudence that one is not bound by a 
judgment in personam in a litigation in which he is not designated as a 
party or to which he has not been made a party by service of process.”58 
Moreover, as evidenced by the common criticism that class attorneys 
                                                     
“most adventuresome of the new types”). Professor Kaplan was the reporter for the 1966 
Amendments to the Rules of Civil Procedure, which included the amendments creating Rule 
23(b)(3). 
There are two other permissible categories of class actions, both of which involve situations 
where the remedy is, as a practical matter, indivisible with respect to the class. ALI, PRINCIPLES, 
supra note 12, § 2.04(b). Specifically, the first category, codified under Rule 23(b)(1)(A) and Rule 
23(b)(2), permits class actions when separate actions “would create a risk of . . . incompatible 
standards of conduct for the party opposing the class,” such as when the plaintiffs seek “final 
injunctive relief or corresponding declaratory relief” which applies to “the class as a whole.” See 
FED. R. CIV. P. 23(b)(1)–(2); ALI, PRINCIPLES, supra note 12, § 2.04 & reporters’ notes cmt. a 
(noting that these two provisions are identical). The second category, codified under Rule 
23(b)(1)(B), permits class actions when separate actions, “as a practical matter . . . would 
substantially impair or impede [the nonparties’] ability to protect their interests,” and has been 
primarily used in “limited fund” cases in which “claims [are] made by numerous persons against a 
fund insufficient to satisfy all claims.” Ortiz v. Fibreboard Corp., 527 U.S. 815, 834 (1999) (quoting 
Advisory Committee’s Notes on FED. R. CIV. P. 23). It should be noted that the problem of scale 
discussed here also arises in the first two categories, but this Article focuses on the third category 
for purposes of clarity. 
55. FED. R. CIV. P. 23(b)(3). 
56. Kaplan, supra note 54, at 497.  
57. See Coffee, Governance, supra note 7, at 309–10, 317. 
58. Hansberry v. Lee, 311 U.S. 32, 40–41 (1940) (citing Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714 (1877)). 
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enter into “sweetheart” settlements at the expense of the class 
members,59 the class attorney also has the power to settle the claims 
without the class members’ consent. 
The lack of control of the class members over the class attorney arises 
from two further features of the class action. First, although Rule 23 
designates the “representative party” as the party who is permitted to 
obtain class certification, the class attorney is, in effect, the relevant 
party who initiates and controls the litigation.60 Because percentage fees 
are the norm in Rule 23(b)(3) class actions, class attorneys typically 
have the largest stake in the potential recovery, and thus the most 
incentive to invest in the claims.61 Because of this, class attorneys also 
typically incur all of the costs in litigating the class action, as the other 
class members, including the class representative, typically have claims 
that are too small to justify significant investment.62 Accordingly, given 
her  incentives, the class attorney is the one that makes investment 
decisions concerning the claims, including the decision to litigate or 
settle. 
Second, Rule 23 permits the certification of a class that is subject to a 
binding judgment entered in the litigation without requiring class 
members to “opt in” or otherwise consent to inclusion in the class.63 At 
best, in a Rule 23(b)(3) class action, a class member has an opportunity 
                                                     
59. Hay & Rosenberg, supra note 3, at 1390–91 (discussing sweetheart settlements). 
60. FED. R. CIV. P. 23(a). 
61. ALI, PRINCIPLES, supra note 12, § 3.13 cmt. b (noting that “most courts and commentators 
now believe that the percentage method is superior” to the lodestar method of determining class 
attorneys’ fees); Janet Cooper Alexander, Contingent Fees and Class Actions, 47 DEPAUL L. REV. 
347, 349 (1998) (“Recently, there has been a trend in common fund cases away from the lodestar 
and toward a return to the percentage-of-the-recovery method of calculating fees.”). Admittedly, the 
class attorney may also be paid under a “lodestar” method, which compensates the attorney based 
upon the amount of time spent on the action. See Morris A. Ratner & William B. Rubenstein, Profit 
for Costs, 63 DEPAUL L. REV. 587, 594 (2014). Nevertheless, fees calculated under the lodestar 
method are not materially different from what would have been paid on a percentage basis. See 
Alexander, supra, at 350. 
62. Rand v. Monsanto Co., 926 F.2d 596, 599 (7th Cir. 1991) (rejecting the district court finding 
that the class representative was not adequate because he or she would not bear the total costs of the 
litigation, noting that “[t]he very feature that makes class treatment appropriate—small individual 
stakes and large aggregate ones—ensures that the representative will be unwilling to vouch for the 
entire costs”); Coffee, Accountability, supra note 6, at 412 (“Client financing of the action is highly 
unlikely because of the inherent collective action problem in class actions; that is, a class 
representative who expects to receive one percent (or less) of the recovery will not logically finance 
one hundred percent of the action’s costs.”). 
63. See John Bronsteen & Owen Fiss, The Class Action Rule, 78 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1419, 
1449–50 (2003) (noting that Rule 23 does not require the parties to “opt in” to the class action, but 
arguing that such an “opt in” should be necessary for class action settlements).  
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to opt out of the class action,64 or at least object to a proposed 
settlement.65 Given that Rule 23(b)(3) class actions typically involve 
small claims, few class members either opt out or object and typically 
have no incentive to do either given the small amount at stake.66 
Accordingly, the lack of both opportunities and incentives for the class 
members to either exit the class or voice their concerns gives the class 
attorney free rein to develop the claims as she sees fit. 
Nevertheless, the class attorney is restrained in how she can dispose 
of the property in two important ways. First, the law of champerty and 
maintenance generally prohibits all claim holders from either selling all 
or part of their claims to third parties (champerty) or otherwise 
“receiving improper aid from a stranger to the case (maintenance).”67 
Admittedly, there are exceptions, such as the subrogation of claims68 and 
contingency fee arrangements,69 which allow a partial interest in the 
claims to be alienated. Nevertheless, class attorneys typically cannot sell 
the claims, or a share of the claims, to any third party other than the 
                                                     
64. See FED. R. CIV. P. 23(c)(2)(B)(v) (requiring a class action certified under Rule 23(b)(3) to 
provide notice “that the court will exclude from the class any member who requests exclusion”).  
65. Id. 23(e)(5) (“Any class member may object to the proposal if it requires court approval under 
this subdivision (e) . . . .”). 
66. See Theodore Eisenberg & Geoffrey Miller, The Role of Opt-Outs and Objectors in Class 
Action Litigation: Theoretical and Empirical Issues, 57 VAND. L. REV. 1529, 1563 (2004) (noting 
that, based on an empirical study, “the percentage of opt-outs and objectors are almost always 
small,” and that “[c]lass members appear to be behaving out of apathy or rational ignorance rather 
than making a considered choice not to opt out or object”). 
67. Anthony J. Sebok, The Inauthentic Claim, 64 VAND. L. REV. 61, 66 (2011) (discussing and 
criticizing the law of champerty and maintenance); see also In re Primus, 436 U.S. 412, 424 n.15 
(1978) (“[M]aintenance is helping another prosecute a suit; champerty is maintaining a suit in return 
for a financial interest in the outcome; and barratry is a continuing practice of maintenance or 
champerty.”).  
68. Kenneth S. Reinker & David Rosenberg, Improving Medical Malpractice Law by Letting 
Health Care Insurers Take Charge, 39 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 539, 539 (2011) (defining “insurance 
subrogation” and arguing that insurers should not be limited in what they can recoup). 
69. Sebok, supra note 67, at 99–100 (noting that contingency agreements were “flatly illegal 
under the doctrines of maintenance and champerty,” but that “[c]ourts and legislatures quickly 
found an exception”). In addition, a number of jurisdictions have begun to experiment with third-
party financing of claims, in effect relaxing champerty and maintenance restrictions. See Michele 
DeStefano, Nonlawyers Influencing Lawyers: Too Many Cooks in the Kitchen or Stone Soup?, 
80 FORDHAM L. REV. 2791, 2816–18 (2012) (discussing “claim funding” by third parties in 
Australia and the United Kingdom and noting that it “is considered a fledgling industry in the 
United States”). Over time, greater relaxation of such restrictions may create the market for claims 
that currently does not exist. See Charles R. Korsmo & Minor Myers, Aggregation by Acquisition: 
Replacing Class Actions with a Market for Legal Claims, 101 IOWA L. REV. 1323, 1344 (2016) 
(noting that while the law has moved away from champerty and maintenance restrictions, “these 
doctrines continue to exist in many jurisdictions and pose a serious obstacle to any alienation of 
legal claims”). 
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defendant through a settlement. As a result, class attorneys rely 
predominantly on debt financing to fund their investments.70 
Second, even in a settlement, Rule 23 requires the class attorney to 
seek approval for any settlement of the class members’ claims in a 
fairness hearing.71 In such a fairness hearing, the court examines 
whether the proposed settlement “is fair, reasonable, and adequate.”72 
Accordingly, any proposed sale of the claims to the defendant in a 
settlement is subject to the scrutiny and approval of the court. 
2. Trusts 
Like the class action, there are a wide variety of trust and trust-like 
arrangements.73 For reasons discussed in more detail in the next section, 
this article focuses on expressive, or donative, trusts under United States 
law.74 
A donative trust is created when a settlor conveys the trust property, 
the res, to a trustee for the benefit of others, the beneficiaries.75 
Specifically, the settlor assigns dispositive control, otherwise known as 
legal title, over the res to the trustee, while the residual benefits of the 
res, often referred to as the equitable interest, redound to the 
beneficiaries.76 The trust, like the corporation and other organizational 
forms, separates the control of property from the benefits produced by 
the property.77 
                                                     
70. Samuel Issacharoff, Litigation Funding and the Problem of Agency Cost in Representative 
Actions, 63 DEPAUL L. REV. 561, 563 (2014) (“The prohibitions encompassed in the barratry-
champerty-maintenance troika basically restrict the ability to raise money for legal ventures through 
equity financing.”). Admittedly, attorneys can, and often do, receive some equity financing from 
other attorneys. See Nora Freeman Engstrom, Lawyer Lending: Costs and Consequences, 63 
DEPAUL L. REV. 377, 389–90 (2014). Nevertheless, debt financing remains the dominant mode of 
financing. See Issacharoff, supra, at 563. 
71. FED. R. CIV. P. 23(e) (“The claims, issues, or defenses of a certified class may be settled, 
voluntarily dismissed, or compromised only with the court’s approval.”). 
72. Id. 23(e)(2). 
73. Campos, Justiciability, supra note 24, at 572 (discussing other “trust-like” arrangements). 
74. See infra section I.A.3. 
75. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS §§ 2–3 (AM. LAW INST. 2003) (defining a trust and the 
roles of the settlor, trustee, beneficiary and the “trust property”); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF 
TRUSTS §§ 2–3 (AM. LAW INST. 1958) (same). 
76. See Hansmann & Mattei, supra note 19, at 440.  
77. See Langbein, supra note 19, at 627 (“We treat the trustee as the new owner for the purpose 
of managing the property, while the trust deal strips the trustee of the benefits of ownership.”); 
Joseph T. Walsh, The Fiduciary Foundation of Corporate Law, 27 J. CORP. L. 333, 333–35 (2002) 
(“In operation, the two entities, corporation and trust, were analogous in the separation of legal title 
from beneficial interest and in the separate, continued existence of the structure whether in trust or 
in corporate form.”); cf. ALI, PRINCIPLES, supra note 12, § 1.05 reporters’ notes cmt. a (citing 
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The trust, however, differs from the corporation in two important 
respects. First, and most importantly, the trustee is not, as a default, 
subject to the will of the beneficiaries, although the trustee nevertheless 
owes the beneficiaries a fiduciary duty to manage the res in their 
interest.78 In contrast, in a corporation, “the shareholders can vote to 
elect or remove the corporation’s directors; they may also vote to amend 
the corporation’s bylaws, or to approve a significant transaction such as 
a merger.”79 Second, the trustee must comply with the terms of the trust 
instrument. Indeed, the intent of the settlor in creating the trust, which is 
reflected in the trust instrument, has been understood as the “polestar” 
that “guide[s] all aspects of trust administration.”80 
Like the class action, there is not a well-developed market for the 
beneficiary’s shares in the trust property. Beneficial interests in trusts do 
not tend to attract buyers because trust law typically makes it difficult to 
deviate from “the settlor’s dead-hand interests” as reflected in the trust 
instrument.81 In fact, in spendthrift trusts, which are still the default in 
some states,82 the beneficiaries’ interest in the res cannot be sold at all.83 
The terms of the spendthrift trust are analogous to the champerty and 
maintenance restrictions on the class members’ claims. 
                                                     
literature on “agency relationships” in which the “ownership of assets and control of their 
disposition [are] separated,” including trusts). 
78. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 14B cmt. a (AM. LAW INST. 1958) (noting that, 
unlike in the context of a corporation, a trustee “may or may not be subject to the beneficiary’s 
control”); ALLEN & KRAAKMAN, supra note 20, § 2.3.3, at 36 (noting that “the trustee is not 
ordinarily subject to the control of the beneficiary.”) Again, it should be noted that this is simply a 
default rule, and that a settlor may permit some beneficiary control in the trust instrument. See 
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 4 cmt. a(1) (AM. LAW INST. 2003) (“[M]any (but not all) of 
trust law consists of ‘default rules,’ as opposed to mandatory or restrictive rules, and is therefore 
subordinate to the terms (or ‘law’) of the trust.”). For now I will focus on the default rule, although I 
will explain later in the article why focusing on the default rules of trust law is appropriate for 
purposes of developing the model. See infra section I.A.3. 
79. JAMES D. COX & THOMAS LEE HAZEN, TREATISE ON THE LAW OF CORPORATIONS, §§ 13:1, 
22:13 (3d ed. 2010). 
80. Lee-ford Tritt, The Limitations of an Economic Agency Cost Theory of Trust Law, 32 
CARDOZO L. REV. 2579, 2640 (2011) (quoting In re Sherman Trust, 179 N.W. 109, 112 (Iowa 
1920)). 
81. Sitkoff, supra note 34, at 566. 
82. DUKEMINIER, SITKOFF, & LINDGREN, supra note 34, at 695 (“In Delaware . . . all trusts are 
presumptively spendthrift, and in New York all trusts are presumptively spendthrift with respect to 
income.”) (citations omitted). 
83. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS §§ 152–53 (AM. LAW INST. 1959) (defining “a 
spendthrift trust” as a trust which has a “valid restraint on the voluntary and involuntary transfer of 
the interest of the beneficiary”); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 58 (AM. LAW INST. 2003) 
(providing that such trusts are valid). 
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3. Method 
The model developed in this article analogizes class actions to trusts. 
Analogizing the class action to other organizational forms is a common 
method of scholarship on the class action, if not legal reasoning in 
general.84 Scholars have analogized class actions to corporations,85 labor 
unions,86 states,87 and even the Venetian commenda.88 
This Article analogizes the class action to the trust, in part, to identify 
the inconsistent treatment of class actions as compared to trusts. Thus, 
this Article leverages the general acceptability of the trust to show that 
similar features found in the class action should not be considered either 
controversial or “extraordinary.”89 
Analogizing class actions to trusts has additional advantages. First, 
trusts, as creatures of equity, are primarily the product of judge-made 
law.90 Consequently, the trust improves upon other analogous forms like 
                                                     
84. Scott Brewer, Exemplary Reasoning: Semantics, Pragmatics, and the Rational Force of Legal 
Argument by Analogy, 109 HARV. L. REV. 923, 926 (1996) (“[L]egal argument is often associated 
with its own distinct method, usually referred to as ‘reasoning (or argument) by analogy’; indeed, if 
metaphor is the dreamwork of language, then analogy is the brainstorm of jurists’-diction.”). 
85. Coffee, Accountability, supra note 6, at 422 (“The potential for enhanced accountability in 
class actions can probably best be assessed by contrasting class action procedures with the 
comparable accountability mechanisms in corporate law. Strong analogies exist.”); Shapiro, supra 
note 5, at 921 (presenting an “entity” theory of the class action which analogizes the class action to 
“congregations, trade unions, joint stock companies, corporations . . . municipalities and other 
governmental entities”); Charles Silver & Lynn Baker, I Cut, You Choose: The Role of Plaintiffs’ 
Counsel in Allocating Settlement Proceeds, 84 VA. L. REV. 1465, 1465–66 (1998) (noting that class 
actions “resemble corporations,” and using this analogy to examine attorney-client conflicts). 
86. Shapiro, supra note 5, at 921; see also Coffee, Regulation, supra note 6, at 879 (in discussing 
the class action, noting that “it is useful to look beyond the immediate context of civil litigation to 
functionally analogous settings where similar problems arise, such as bankruptcy reorganizations 
and labor negotiations”); John C. Coffee, Jr., Rethinking the Class Action: A Policy Primer on 
Reform, 62 IND. L.J. 625, 627 (1987) (“To understand the tensions within the class [of a class 
action], it is useful to examine the experience in related contexts—such as collective bargaining 
negotiations and corporate re-organizations in bankruptcy—where claimants have also had to 
dispute among themselves over the distribution of a limited fund.”). 
87. Issacharoff, Governance, supra note 5, at 338 (“[I]t is useful to think of the class action 
mechanism as fundamentally a centralizing device designed to accomplish some of the same 
functions as performed by the state.”). 
88. Issacharoff, State Authority, supra note 5, at 385 (analogizing the class action to the Venetian 
commenda, “a rudimentary type of joint stock company, which formed only for the duration of a 
single trading mission” (quoting DARON ACEMOGLU & JAMES A. ROBINSON, WHY NATIONS FAIL: 
THE ORIGINS OF POWER, PROSPERITY, AND POVERTY 152 (2012))). 
89. Cf. Eisenberg & Yeazell, supra note 38, at 466 (arguing that institutional reform litigation 
should not be seen as “extraordinary” given the “the willingness of past and contemporary courts to 
supervise complex institutions”).  
90. I say “primarily” because trust law is also regulated by state statutes that are informed by 
uniform acts. See David M. English, The Impact of Uniform Laws on the Teaching of Trusts and 
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the qui tam action, which scholars have used to suggest that the class 
action can only be reformed (or even instituted) through legislation.91 
Second, trusts are a quintessential form of private law, and thus avoid 
the concerns with “legitimacy” that arise when the class action is 
analogized to public law organizations like the state.92 
However, the primary goal of analogizing class actions to trusts is to 
use the trust as a guide in designing the class action. Indeed, those 
scholars who look to corporate law and its agency cost literature do so 
precisely for guidance in reforming the class action.93 In using the trust 
as a design resource, this Article does not assume that trust law is perfect 
nor wade into the intricacies of trust law. Instead, it examines how basic 
features of the trust solve certain problems commonly found in both the 
class action and trust contexts. These basic features are then used to 
create a simple, functional model of the trust, which is then used as a 
reference for the class action. 
Using a functional model of the trust as a guide in designing the class 
action is especially appropriate because the class action is primarily 
defined in functional terms. The modern class action, including the Rule 
23(b)(3) category, was explicitly designed “on functional lines 
                                                     
Estates, 58 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 689, 689 (2014) (noting that “close to thirty uniform acts relating to 
Trusts and Estates . . . have been approved”).  
91. See MARTIN H. REDISH, WHOLESALE JUSTICE: CONSTITUTIONAL DEMOCRACY AND THE 
PROBLEM OF THE CLASS ACTION LAWSUIT 23–56 (2009) (defining “‘faux’ class actions” as class 
actions which provide no compensation to the class members and only enrich the class attorney, and 
criticizing them because, unlike qui tam actions, they do not arise from legislation); cf. David 
Freeman Engstrom, Private Enforcement’s Pathways: Lessons from Qui Tam Litigation, 114 
COLUM. L. REV. 1913, 2003 & n.284 (2014) (noting that an “implicit assumption of Redish’s work” 
is a “tend[ency] to cast any lawmaking that occurs beyond legislative or administrative precincts as 
lacking a democratic pedigree”). 
92. See Elizabeth Chamblee Burch, Governing Securities Class Actions, 80 U. CIN. L. REV. 299, 
306 (2011) (analogizing the class action to “political governance” models like the state, and arguing 
that “the political governance model . . . . adds a . . . critical dimension: the demand for legitimacy 
in the institutional arrangement”); Richard A. Nagareda, Class Actions in the Administrative State: 
Kalven and Rosenfield Revisited, 75 U. CHI. L. REV. 603, 625 (2008) (analogizing class actions to 
administrative agencies, and arguing that “the reason why the law of class actions must address that 
question [of class certification] as one of authority and legitimacy, whereas the administrative state 
need not, is this: the administrative state operates based on an ongoing delegation of authority that 
stems ultimately from the polity in the aggregate, whereas the delegation of authority effected by 
class certification is of a temporary, one-shot nature”).  
93. See Coffee, Accountability, supra note 6, at 422 (“The potential for enhanced accountability 
in class actions can probably best be assessed by contrasting class action procedures with the 
comparable accountability mechanisms in corporate law. Strong analogies exist.”). 
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responsive to those recurrent life patterns which call for mass litigation 
through representative parties.”94 
As discussed in more detail below, the simple, functional model of 
the trust developed here is useful because the trust and the class action 
are both used to solve the same category of problems, what I call 
problems of scale.95 Moreover, and as noted above, the trust and the 
class action already share certain relevant features, such as the inability 
of the recipients to control the manager directly. This similarity makes it 
easier to translate any suggested reform from one context to the other. 
Finally, the trust model comes with a well-developed body of law that 
courts and legislators can look to in reforming the class action. 
Accordingly, a trust model prevents one from reinventing the wheel in 
designing the class action. 
Using the trust as a design resource poses some potential problems 
that are worth addressing. First, other trust-like arrangements may be 
more similar to the class action.96 The term “trust” has been used to 
describe relationships such as that of the administrator of an intestate 
estate to the estate’s heirs,97 and a guardian ad litem to a person who 
lacks capacity.98 
This Article focuses on expressive, or donative, trusts because the 
expressive trust has been the primary focus of recent developments in 
the functional analysis of trust law.99 Accordingly, expressive trusts 
provide the clearest expression of the functional features of trust and 
trust-like arrangements. The trust is also one of the simplest forms of 
organization, and its simplicity both facilitates constructing a model, as 
                                                     
94. Kaplan, supra note 54, at 497 (discussing the 1966 amendments to the Federal Rules of Civil 
Procedure that produced the modern class action). 
95. See infra section I.B.2. 
96. Campos, Justiciability, supra note 24, at 571–72. 
97. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 6 & cmt. a (AM. LAW INST. 1959) (providing that 
“[a]n executorship or an administratorship is not a trust,” but noting that both are fiduciaries, and 
that the main difference between the two is “the tribunals which enforced the duties”); see also 
Campos, Justiciability, supra note 24, at 572 & n.108.  
98. 1 AUSTIN WAKEMAN SCOTT ET AL., SCOTT AND ASCHER ON TRUSTS § 2.3.3 (5th ed. 2006) 
(“A guardian of the property of one under an incapacity is certainly a trustee in the broad sense of 
the term, because a guardian is under a duty to deal with the property for the ward’s benefit.”); see 
also Campos, Justiciability, supra note 24, at 572 & n.109. 
99. See, e.g., Hansmann & Mattei, supra note 19 (taking a functional approach to trusts); 
Langbein, supra note 19 (arguing that function of trust is contractual); Sitkoff, supra note 19 
(providing an agency cost model of the trust). 
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well as avoids any confusion that might result from looking to more 
complex forms.100 
It is worth noting that this Article further restricts its focus to the 
United States law on trusts, as English law tends to allow beneficiaries 
more control over the trustee, and is thus not as analogous to the class 
action as the U.S. trust.101 In fact, U.S. law on class actions, like U.S. 
law on trusts, provides the recipients much less control than its European 
counterparts. For example, in Europe, class actions typically are 
permitted only when the class members “opt in,” or consent, to 
participation in the action.102 
Second, much of trust law consists of default rules that can be 
customized by the settlor through the terms of the trust instrument.103 
Nevertheless, such default rules are still useful in developing a 
functional model of the trust. In general, the default rules of the trust are 
not penalty defaults,104 but are meant to reflect the terms a settlor would 
generally prefer in setting up a trust.105 Accordingly, the default rules 
can be understood as a guide to the function of the trust and the 
problems it addresses. Moreover, trust law also consists of mandatory 
                                                     
100. See Hansmann & Mattei, supra note 19, at 437 (“The private trust is among the simplest of 
the forms of enterprise organization provided for in the law and thus makes a particularly 
convenient focus for study.”). 
101. See Sitkoff, supra note 19, at 662–63 (noting that “English law resolves significantly more 
of the settlor-beneficiary tension raised by questions of trust termination and modification in favor 
of the beneficiaries”); see also A.I. Ogus, The Trust as Governance Structure, 36 U. TORONTO L.J. 
186, 202–03 (1986) (noting this difference). 
102. See Coffee, Governance, supra note 6, at 330 (“With only a few exceptions, existing 
European class action procedures employ an opt-in rather than an opt-out procedure.”). 
103. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 4 cmt. a(1) (AM. LAW INST. 2003) (“[M]any (but not 
all) of trust law consists of ‘default rules,’ as opposed to mandatory or restrictive rules, and is 
therefore subordinate to the terms (or ‘law’) of the trust.”). 
104. Ian Ayres & Robert Gertner, Filling Gaps in Incomplete Contracts: An Economic Theory of 
Default Rules, 99 YALE L.J. 87, 91 (1989) (defining “penalty defaults” as “purposefully set at what 
the parties would not want—in order to encourage the parties to reveal information to each other or 
to third parties (especially the courts)” (emphasis added)). 
105. See Robert H. Sitkoff, An Economic Theory of Fiduciary Law, in PHILOSOPHICAL 
FOUNDATIONS OF FIDUCIARY LAW 197, 204 (Andrew S. Gold & Paul B. Miller eds., 2014) (noting 
that “[t]he requirement that a fiduciary act in the principal’s best interests . . . is informed by what 
the parties would have agreed if they had considered a given contingency”). 
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rules that cannot be changed.106 These mandatory rules provide further 
guidance on the function of the trust.107 
Third, because trust law can be customized, the trust has been used in 
a variety of contexts.108 The versatility of the trust is, in fact, a primary 
(if not the most important) benefit of the trust.109 Accordingly, it is 
worth emphasizing that the functional model of the trust used here is not 
meant to provide an all-encompassing representation of the trust and its 
functions. Instead, the model developed here is based on the use of a 
trust to address a category of problems—problems of scale. Thus, the 
model of the trust used here is limited to this use and is not meant to go 
beyond it. 
Finally, some features of the trust that comprise the trust model are 
not unique to the trust. For example, family firms and other closely held 
companies can also contain conflicting interests and also lack a market 
for corporate control.110 As an initial matter, the existence of these other 
corporate forms bolsters the argument that many controversial features 
of the class action should not be seen as controversial. 
Nevertheless, I focus on trust law for two reasons. First, and as noted 
earlier, the trust has a general acceptability that is useful in supporting 
controversial features of the class action. Second, some of the features of 
the trust that are relevant to the model are, in fact, unique to trusts. This 
includes, for example, imposing an explicit duty on the trustee to treat 
the beneficiaries impartially, which is not present in other corporate 
forms.111 
                                                     
106. John H. Langbein, Mandatory Rules in the Law of Trusts, 98 NW. U. L. REV. 1105, 1105 
(2004) (“[T]he law of trusts consists overwhelmingly of default rules that the settlor who creates the 
trust may alter or negate. There are, however, some mandatory rules, which the settlor is forbidden 
to vary.”).  
107. See id. at 1109 (noting that a class of mandatory rules are based on the presupposition that 
“that the settlor propounded the trust and its terms for the purpose of benefiting the beneficiaries”). 
108. Hansmann & Mattei, supra note 19, at 466–69 (noting use of trusts in pension funds, mutual 
funds, and for asset securitization). 
109.  SCOTT ET AL., supra note 98, § 1.1, at 4 (noting that “[t]he purposes for which we can create 
trusts are as unlimited as our imagination”). 
110. See Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel, Close Corporations and Agency Costs, 38 
STAN. L. REV. 271, 274 (1986) (“On the other hand, investors in closely held corporations lack a 
public market for claims. (We refer to claims as shares or equity, but the debt in close corporations 
also may be a residual claim.)”); id. at 275 (“[T]he lack of an active market in shares creates 
conflicts over dividend policy and other distributions.”). Conflicts can also arise in a number of 
commercial settings. See Steven L. Schwarcz, Fiduciaries with Conflicting Obligations, 94 MINN. 
L. REV. 1867 (2010) (discussing examples). I thank Holger Spamann for his comments on this 
point. 
111. Sitkoff, supra note 19, at 652 (noting that the duty is “a salient distinguishing characteristic 
of trust law as organizational law”).  
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B. The Class Action as Trust 
In this section I set forth the trust model of the class action, focusing 
on the following elements: (1) the claims are analogous to the res of a 
trust; (2) the class members are analogous to the beneficiaries of a trust; 
and (3) the class action attorney can be understood as a trustee over the 
claims of the class members. 
1. The Claims as the Res 
Like the res of the trust, the claims of the class members serve as the 
basis for the trust-like relationships created by the class action. A claim 
for damages, or a “chose in action,” is generally recognized as a form of 
property.112 A claim for damages, like other “chose[s] in action” such as 
“debts” or  “contractual rights,” is “an interest in property not 
immediately reducible to possession.”113 Such claims are reducible to 
possession once they have been adjudicated in the plaintiff’s favor and 
are “merge[d]” into a “judgment.”114 Claims for injunctive or similar 
relief are also generally considered property.115 
Consistent with the functional perspective taken in this Article, here I 
focus on the functions performed by claims for relief. An understanding 
of the claim as property is consistent with this approach because holders 
of claims can exclude the world from litigating the claim.116 Such an in 
                                                     
112. Richards v. Jefferson Cty., 517 U.S. 793, 804 (1996) (noting that a right to a lawsuit, or a 
“chose in action,” is “a protected property interest in its own right”); Phillips Petroleum Co. v. 
Shutts, 472 U.S. 797, 807 (1985) (“[A] chose in action is a constitutionally recognized property 
interest possessed by each of the plaintiffs.”) (citing Mullane v. Cent. Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 
339 U.S. 306, 313 (1950)); see also Campos, Mass Torts, supra note 24, at 1092 (noting that the 
“claim for compensatory damages” is a property interest (citing Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Shutts, 
472 U.S. 797, 807 (1985); Logan v. Zimmerman, 455 U.S. 422, 428 (1982)). 
113. Sprint Commc’ns Co. v. APCC Servs., Inc., 554 U.S. 269, 275 (2008) (citing 2 WILLIAM 
BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *442). 
114. Merger, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (9th ed. 2009) (defining a “merger” in civil procedure 
as “[t]he effect of a judgment for the plaintiff, which absorbs any claim that was the subject of the 
lawsuit into the judgment, so that the plaintiff’s rights are confined to enforcing the judgment”). 
115. Logan v. Zimmerman Brush Co., 455 U.S. 422, 424–25, 430–31 (1982) (concluding that 
“[t]he right to use the FEPA’s adjudicatory procedures” to seek, among other things, 
“reinstatement” to a job, is a “property interest,” and that property interests protected by the Due 
Process Clause “are varied and, as often as not, intangible, relating ‘to the whole domain of social 
and economic fact’”).  
116. This right to exclude others from disposing of the claim manifests itself most prominently in 
the Article III context, where, as a prudential matter, there is a “general prohibition on a litigant’s 
raising another person’s legal rights.” See Lexmark Int’l, Inc. v. Static Control Components, Inc., 
__ U.S. __, 134 S. Ct. 1377, 1386 (2014) (citing Elk Grove Unified Sch. Dist. v. Newdow, 542 U.S. 
1, 12 (2004)). 
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rem right to exclude is typically considered a defining feature of 
property.117 
Claims perform two important functions. The first function is to 
enforce what can be called a primary right or entitlement. This function 
is apparent in a claim for injunctive relief, in which a plaintiff asks the 
court to enforce the law by ordering the defendant to comply with it. 
Injunctive relief is generally considered to provide “property rule[]” 
protection because it allows the holder of the primary right to coercively 
stop individuals from taking the entitlement without the holder’s 
consent.118 
Claims for damages also protect primary entitlements, but do so 
“indirectly, through the deterrent effect of damage actions that may be 
brought once harm occurs.”119 Claims for damages provide “liability 
rule” protection, in which a party may take that primary entitlement “if 
he is willing to pay [the] objectively determined value for it.”120 
Second, along with enforcing primary entitlements, claims also 
provide compensation for harm done. Claims for compensatory 
damages, where by definition the damages are calculated to offset the 
harm done to the plaintiff, clearly fall in this category. But injunctions 
can also provide compensation. For example, a “reparative injunction” 
directly compensates the plaintiff, not with money, but by ordering the 
defendant to engage in remedial measures.121 Moreover, insofar as 
                                                     
117. E.g., Thomas W. Merrill, Property and the Right to Exclude, 77 NEB. L. REV. 730 (1998); cf. 
Henry E. Smith, Property and Property Rules, 79 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1719, 1792–93 (2004) (noting 
that “exclusion is likely to be the predominant element of the method used to define” property rights 
given that property rights are rights against “unspecified” persons in the world). 
118. Guido Calabresi & A. Douglas Melamed, Property Rules, Liability Rules, and Inalienability: 
One View of the Cathedral, 85 HARV. L. REV. 1089, 1115–16 (1972) (showing that a right to be free 
from a nuisance protected by a “property rule” permits the entitlement holder to “enjoin [the] 
nuisance”); Smith, supra note 117, at 1720 (noting that “property rules” utilize “injunctions . . . [to] 
make a nonconsensual taking of an entitlement less attractive than bargaining to a consensual price 
with the present owner”). 
119. Steven Shavell, Liability for Harm Versus Regulation of Safety, 13 J. LEGAL STUD. 357, 357 
(1984); see also Hughes v. Kore of Ind. Enter., Inc., 731 F.3d 672, 677 (7th Cir. 2013) (“A class 
action, like litigation in general, has a deterrent as well as a compensatory objective.”). Injunctions 
can also utilize claims for damages to deter noncompliance with the injunction. Smith, supra note 
117, at 1720 (noting that “property rules” also utilize “supracompensatory damages” to prevent 
takings). 
120. Calabresi & Melamed, supra note 118, at 1090–92. Accordingly, a “liability rule” 
effectively assigns a call option to take plaintiff’s primary entitlement, with the strike price valued 
at the damages caused by the taking. IAN AYRES, OPTIONAL LAW: THE STRUCTURE OF LEGAL 
ENTITLEMENTS 5 (2005). 
121. OWEN M. FISS, THE CIVIL RIGHTS INJUNCTION 10 (1978) (discussing “reparative 
injunctions”). 
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compliance with an injunction is enforced through a contempt action, 
such a contempt action can mimic a claim for damages if the sanction 
sought is used to compensate the plaintiff for harm done.122 
Understanding both the claim’s enforcement function and its 
compensation function is necessary to evaluate any disposition of the 
claim. Whether a claim should be settled, litigated, or abandoned will 
depend on how each option would affect both the enforcement and 
compensation the claim provides. Indeed, different uses of the claim 
may lead to a different mix of enforcement and compensation. In such 
cases, one must evaluate which mix is preferable. 
Two things affect the optimality of various trade-offs between 
enforcement and compensation. First, many legal violations result in 
injuries that cannot be fully compensated through monetary damages, 
such as a deceased loved one or a lost limb. For such “nonpecuniary 
losses,” no amount of money will buy back what was lost.123 Given the 
possibility of nonpecuniary losses, improved enforcement is preferable 
to improved compensation because it is better to prevent such losses 
than to imperfectly compensate for them.124 Second, even in the absence 
of nonpecuniary losses, adjudicating claims is costly, and under the 
American Rule, the parties bear their own litigation costs.125 As a result, 
litigation costs diminish the compensation provided by a claim. 
Finally, it is worth noting that claims, and civil liability in general, 
may not be necessary insofar as (1) the parties can contract ex ante 
concerning the legal violation, (2) market forces sufficiently induce 
potential defendants to comply with the law, or (3) the conduct is 
regulated by other means.126 One party, for example, could assume the 
                                                     
122. Id. at 9 (noting that a contempt action for enforcement of an injunction “can properly be 
compared to the damage action or criminal prosecution”); cf. Campos, Mass Torts, supra note 24, at 
1103 (noting that “[t]he correct analogue to the damage remedy . . . is not the injunction but the 
contempt action”). 
123. Campos, Mass Torts, supra note 24, at 1085 (discussing nonpecuniary losses). 
124. See David Rosenberg, Mandatory-Litigation Class Action: The Only Option for Mass Tort 
Cases, 115 HARV. L. REV. 831, 846 & n.32 (2002) (noting that, given nonpecuniary losses, “[b]y 
definition, the costs of preventing unreasonable risk are lower than the costs of compensating loss 
resulting from such risk”). 
125. Alyeska Pipeline Serv. Co. v. Wilderness Soc’y, 421 U.S. 240, 247 (1975) (defining the 
“American rule,” stating that “[i]n the United States, the prevailing litigant is ordinarily not entitled 
to collect a reasonable attorneys’ fee from the loser”). 
126. See A. Mitchell Polinsky & Steven Shavell, The Uneasy Case for Product Liability, 123 
HARV. L. REV. 1437, 1443–44 (2010) (noting that ex ante contracting and market pressure in 
products liability contexts may obviate the need for the use of tort liability); id. at 1450–51 
(discussing “government regulation” as an alternative to liability); id. at 1486 (discussing 
contracting as an alternative to liability). 
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risk of injury that comes with a product in exchange for a lower price.127 
This Article assumes that, with a few exceptions, the use of civil 
liability, and thus the claims themselves, are both socially desirable and 
avoid the distortions that arise when liability is unnecessary. 
2. The Class Members as the Beneficiaries 
In using a simple model of the trust as a guide for understanding the 
class action, I analogize the class members to the beneficiaries. At first 
glance, the analogy is intuitive because class members and beneficiaries 
typically lack either the ability or motivation to dispose of the relevant 
property optimally. A “common motivation[]” for creating a trust is “to 
provid[e] property management for those who cannot, ought not, or wish 
not to manage for themselves.”128 Similarly, a common motivation for 
the use of class actions is to “vindicat[e] the rights of groups of people 
who individually would be without effective strength to bring their 
opponents into court at all.”129 
But the analogy is especially useful because the class members in a 
class action and the beneficiaries of trusts in commonly used contexts 
both share a more specific problem—a problem of scale. The problem of 
scale that both the class action and trust share has three features: 
 
(1) the recipients have a divided interest in the managed 
property; 
(2) the recipients cannot invest in, or otherwise dispose of, the 
managed property at the right scale; and 
(3) no well-developed or thick market exists for the interests of 
the recipients in the managed property. 
 
This last feature is crucial, because it distinguishes both the class 
action and the trust from the corporation. In corporate contexts, third 
parties have access to thick markets to acquire divided shares in a 
corporation, such as through a tender offer,130 to reap the benefits of 
                                                     
127. Id. at 1443. 
128. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 27 cmt. 2(b)(1) (AM. LAW INST. 2003); see also 
Sitkoff, supra note 19, at 668 (“[T]he donative settlor’s motivation for interposing a trustee between 
the trust assets and the beneficiary, tax considerations aside, is often a lack of faith in the 
beneficiaries’ judgment.”). 
129. See Kaplan, supra note 54, at 497. 
130. See Lucian Arye Bebchuk, Efficient and Inefficient Sales of Corporate Control, 109 Q.J. 
ECON. 957, 957 (1994) (noting that, in the corporate context, “[t]ender offers or takeover bids are 
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investing in firm assets at the right scale. In contrast and as noted earlier, 
in both the class action and trust contexts, there exists no well-developed 
market for control over the relevant property.131 
In the absence of such a well-developed market, divided control rights 
can lead to suboptimal investment. This is because each recipient has 
only a partial interest in the managed property, and thus each recipient 
lacks a private incentive to maximize optimally the entire managed 
property. More importantly, collective action problems can prevent 
recipients from acting together to invest at the appropriate scale. This, in 
a nutshell, is the problem of scale that the class members and the 
beneficiaries in many trusts share; it is no different from the “tragedy of 
commons” problems that typically arise when there is divided ownership 
of a common good.132 
The problem of scale is readily apparent in small claims litigation, the 
typical case certified under Rule 23(b)(3).133 Suppose that a 
manufacturer designed and sold certain models of washing machines 
that all suffered from the same defect in their washer drums, and that the 
defect resulted in mold growth, noxious odors, and smelly clothes.134 A 
large number of plaintiffs purchased the relevant models, and suffered 
from the noxious odors caused by the defect.135 However, the damages 
suffered by each plaintiff are small, not “large enough to justify the 
expense of an individual suit.”136 The injuries (exposure to bad smells, 
damage to clothing, costs of repairs or replacements) likely cost only in 
                                                     
used when the ownership of the target company is dispersed, with no shareholder holding a 
controlling interest”).  
131. See Coffee, Accountability, supra note 6, at 376 (noting that “what is most distinctive about 
the class action is the absence” of “well-developed markets and voting mechanisms . . . to minimize 
these agency costs”); Sitkoff, supra note 19, at 654 (noting that “there is no well-developed market 
for beneficial interests in trusts”).  
132. Specifically, such problems of scale arise when there are spillovers or externalities that the 
owners of property fail to account for absent partitioning of the property (to avoid such spillovers) 
or collective governance of the property (to capture such spillovers). See Lee Anne Fennell, 
Commons, Anticommons, Semicommons, in RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON THE ECONOMICS OF 
PROPERTY LAW 35, 35–50 (Kenneth Ayotte & Henry E. Smith eds., 2011) (showing that commons 
and anticommons problems that arise from divided ownership of a common good can be understood 
as problems of scale).  
133. See supra section I.A.1.  
134. This example is based on Glazer v. Whirlpool Corp., 722 F.3d 838 (6th Cir. 2013) and 
Butler v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 727 F.3d 796 (7th Cir. 2013). The facts, however, have been 
stylized for clarity. 
135. Butler, 727 F.3d at 798 (“Roughly 200,000 of these Kenmore-brand machines are sold each 
year and there have been many thousands of complaints of bad odors by the machines’ owners.”). 
136. Id. 
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the hundreds,137 while the filing fee alone for a civil action in federal 
court is $400.138 
In the absence of a class action, no individual plaintiff would file a 
lawsuit, because “only a lunatic or a fanatic” would sue for such a small 
amount.139 Indeed, for each plaintiff, declining to sue is the rational 
action to take. 
But the inaction of the plaintiffs leads to a self-defeating result 
because it allows the manufacturer to escape all liability for the defect.140 
By escaping liability, the manufacturer pays a much lower price (in fact, 
no price) for taking the entitlement of each plaintiff to be free from the 
defect. Indeed, the manufacturer, as well as others, will anticipate that it 
can avoid liability for defects that cause a small amount of damage to a 
large group of dispersed plaintiffs. Consequently, in the absence of 
market pressure or other regulation, manufacturers will produce and sell 
products with more defects.141 
The plaintiffs could have avoided this result by sharing the costs 
associated with developing common issues of liability. For example, 
suppose that there is an expert who, for one million dollars, could testify 
that the defect shared by each of the models of washers was the sole 
cause of the mold growth. No individual plaintiff would pay for the 
expert; however if there are one million plaintiffs, then the cost for each 
plaintiff would only be one dollar. Accordingly, it would be rational for 
the class members to hire the expert and share the costs among 
themselves. In fact, had the plaintiffs agreed to share such costs, they 
could have used economies of scale to invest in common issues and, 
thus, threaten the imposition of liability on the defendant by litigating 
the claims.142 
                                                     
137. Id. at 801 (noting that “[t]he present case” involves “tens of thousands of class members, 
each seeking damages of a few hundred dollars”). 
138. See 28 U.S.C. § 1914(a) (2012) (filing fee of “$350”); Judicial Conference Schedule  
of Fees, District Court Miscellaneous Fee Schedule ¶ 14, http://www.uscourts.gov/ 
services-forms/fees/district-court-miscellaneous-fee-schedule [https://perma.cc/77FM-8VE8] 
(“Administrative fee for filing a civil action, suit, or proceeding in a district court, $50.”). 
139. Carnegie v. Household Int’l, Inc., 376 F.3d 656, 661 (7th Cir. 2004) (discussing class 
treatment of small claims litigation). 
140. See Macey & Miller, supra note 6, at 8 (“In the absence of a class action device, such 
injuries would often go unremedied because most individual plaintiffs would not themselves have a 
sufficient economic stake in the litigation to incur the litigation costs.”). 
141. See Polinsky & Shavell, supra note 126, at 1453–55 (noting that “product liability may be 
efficacious” in reducing product risk if market forces and regulation reduces risk suboptimally). 
142. See Campos, Mass Torts, supra note 24, at 1074–76 (discussing economies of scale in 
investing in common issues, using a similar example). For a formal model of these defects, see 
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The plaintiffs do not share costs in part because, in the absence of a 
class action, a plaintiff suing on her own behalf cannot seek 
reimbursement from a later plaintiff who relies upon her work on 
common issues.143 Moreover, while there are no legal restrictions to the 
plaintiffs voluntarily aggregating to share costs on common issues, the 
plaintiffs would fail to aggregate because of the transaction costs 
involved in creating agreements and collecting funds among one 
another.144 Accordingly, in the absence of a class action, the class 
members cannot invest in common issues at the right scale, and thus are 
disadvantaged relative to the defendant, who can invest at the 
appropriate scale. 
This same problem of scale is also present in many situations where 
the trust is commonly used, particularly when conflicts among the 
beneficiaries prevent them from optimally145 maximizing the total 
amount of the res. A common example in trust law, one that “[a]lmost 
every trustee finds,” arises when one beneficiary is assigned an interest 
in the income produced by the res while another is assigned an interest 
in the principal.146 The income beneficiary generally prefers “income-
producing” investments while the principal beneficiary generally prefers 
“long-term capital appreciation.”147 
Although in this situation there are only two beneficiaries, their 
divided interests in the res still would prevent them from investing at the 
right scale had they owned the res outright. Specifically, in the absence 
                                                     
Rosenberg & Spier, supra note 26 (arguing that class action treatment is preferable when the 
plaintiffs are numerous but whose claims share common issues of law and fact). 
143. See David Betson & Jay Tidmarsh, Optimal Class Size, Opt-Out Rights, and “Indivisible” 
Remedies, 79 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 542, 548 n.25 (2011) (citing Sprague v. Ticonic Nat’l Bank, 307 
U.S. 161, 170 (1939)) (“Although it is possible for a court to require parties who benefit from the 
creation of a common fund to share in the costs of creating that fund, the ‘common fund’ concept 
has never been extended so far as to require later plaintiffs who sue independently to reimburse 
earlier plaintiffs whose cases eased their own paths to recovery.”). 
144. ROBERT G. BONE, CIVIL PROCEDURE: THE ECONOMICS OF CIVIL PROCEDURE 263 (2003) 
(“It is true that class members could achieve these same benefits [of cost-sharing] by organizing 
voluntarily. However, the transaction costs of organizing a large group are simply too high.”); see 
also Campos, Mass Torts, supra note 24, at 1079–80 (noting the similar problem in mass tort 
litigation). 
145. I say “optimally” because beneficiaries tend to be risk averse, and thus would prefer 
forgoing an investment that was too risky even if its expected value was positive. See Sitkoff, supra 
note 19, at 654 (“In the paradigmatic donative trust, the residual claimants are risk averse (imagine 
widows and orphans).”). 
146. HESS ET AL., supra note 32, § 816 (“Almost every trustee finds that the trust terms require 
him to pay or apply ‘income’ to or for a temporary beneficiary, and to distribute ‘principal’ to one 
or more beneficiaries prior to or upon termination of the trust.”). 
147. Weisbord, supra note 32, at 181.  
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of the trust, the persons designated as beneficiaries would forgo 
investments that would increase the res overall if that would involve 
either depleting the principal or reducing the income of the res. This is 
true even if the increase in the total res would more than offset any 
decrease in either income or principal. Here, like the small claims class 
members of a class action, it is “normally advantageous to beneficiaries 
collectively and therefore prudent for the trustee to seek a total return 
that is optimal in light of the trust’s purposes and circumstances.”148 
A similar problem of scale can also arise when there is only a single 
beneficiary, as when the beneficiary is young and improvident. In 
Clitherall v. Ogilvie,149 for example, a beneficiary of land held in trust 
who recently turned twenty-one entered into a contract to sell the land 
for what was at most a third of its actual value.150 The Chancery Court of 
South Carolina refused to order specific performance of the 
agreement.151 The court noted in particular that “[y]oung heirs even 
when of age, are under the care and protection of the court,” and that 
“[w]atching for an heir as soon as he comes of age, to get a bargain out 
of him, is a catching bargain and will be discountenanced by the 
court.”152 The permissibility of spendthrift trusts also reflect a concern 
for young and improvident beneficiaries, as spendthrift trusts are 
frequently used when “the [settlor] is concerned that the [beneficiary] is 
irresponsible and will too quickly encumber all of the [res].”153 
Young and improvident heirs, in particular, discount future outcomes 
too heavily relative to present outcomes. To use more colloquial terms, 
such beneficiaries lack “impulse-control”154 or suffer from a “weakness 
of will.”155 Typically such beneficiaries also lack the experience 
                                                     
148. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 111 cmt. a (AM. LAW INST. 2012) (discussing 
income and principal beneficiaries) (emphasis added). 
149. 1 S.C. Eq. (1 Des. Eq.) 250 (S.C. 1792). 
150. Id. at 255; see also Arthur Allen Leff, Unconscionability and the Code—The Emperor’s New 
Clause, 115 U. PA. L. REV. 485, 532 & nn.186 & 190 (1967) (using the case as an example of an 
equity court being protective of “the young” and “the improvident”). 
151. Clitherall, 1 S.C. Eq. (1 Des. Eq.) at 263 (holding that the court will “leave the complainant 
to his remedy at law to recover his damages for the non-performance of the agreement”). 
152. Id. at 256–57. 
153. Hansmann & Mattei, supra note 19, at 452. 
154. See IAN AYRES, CARROTS AND STICKS: UNLOCK THE POWER OF INCENTIVES TO GET 
THINGS DONE 12–14 (2010) (discussing “impulse-control” and the “tendency to hyperbolically 
discount”). 
155. See JON ELSTER, ULYSSES AND THE SIRENS: STUDIES IN RATIONALITY AND IRRATIONALITY 
67 (1979) (noting that “there are no rational grounds for preferring the present over the future,” but 
that “there is the fact of weakness of will. We simply are not always able to follow our rational 
inclinations, and the time preferences may be seen as the formal expression of this inability.”). 
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necessary to make prudent decisions concerning the property to which 
they would hold title were the property their own.156 In Clitherall, the 
young and improvident heir sold the property for far less than what it 
was worth because he lacked sufficient information about the potential 
uses of the land.157 Taken together, the improvident beneficiary suffers 
from a myopia that focuses on her limited understanding of the present 
to the exclusion of the future. Indeed, “improvident” itself means “not 
providing or saving for the future.”158 
The lack of foresight of the improvident beneficiary can also be seen 
as a problem of scale. Her improvidence can be understood as arising 
from an intertemporal conflict between her present and future 
preferences—between her present self and her future selves. In other 
words, by focusing on her present self, she fails to account for all of her 
selves over time. Accordingly, the improvident beneficiary makes self-
defeating decisions that not only harm her future selves, but also current 
self, as all of these selves are inextricably intertwined into one whole. 
This intertemporal conflict is not materially different from the 
interpersonal conflicts found in class actions and in trusts that lead to 
suboptimal investments at the wrong scale. Indeed, any intertemporal 
conflict can be characterized as an interpersonal conflict.159 
                                                     
156. Alessandro Lizzeri & Marciano Siniscalchi, Parental Guidance and Supervised Learning, 
123 Q.J. ECONOMICS 1161, 1162 (2008) (providing a model of parenting by exploring the “basic 
trade-off between sheltering the child from the consequences of his mistakes, and allowing him to 
learn from experience”). 
157. See Clitherall, 1 S.C. Eq. (1 Des. Eq.) at 254 (noting that the heir, in his answer, after the 
sale learned from an “intimate friend” that the land was “prime tide land” and thus “was worth three 
times as much as the price offered for it”). 
158. Improvident, MERRIAM-WEBSTER DICTIONARY, http://www.merriam-webster.com/dict 
ionary/improvident [https://perma.cc/NTL4-9HFD]. 
159. See ELSTER, supra note 155, at 71 (“The absolute priority of the present is somewhat like 
my absolute priority over all other persons: I am I—while they are all ‘out there.’”); Jon Elster, 
Introduction to THE MULTIPLE SELF 1, 2 (Jon Elster ed., 1986) (“The two main strategies for 
concept formation in th[e] field [of the multiple self] rely on, respectively, interpersonal and 
intertemporal phenomena to make sense of the notion of several selves.”); Stuart Albert, Temporal 
Comparison Theory, 84 PSYCHOL. REV. 485 (1977) (pointing out the similarity between temporal 
behavior and social behavior); Robert Nozick, Interpersonal Utility Theory, 2 SOC. CHOICE & 
WELFARE 161, 165 (1985) (“[A] proposal about interpersonal comparisons should, when applicable, 
be plausible as a proposal about intrapersonal intertemporal comparisons of utility. It should be 
plausible that it yields correct utility comparisons for the same person at different times (when it 
applies to yield any comparisons of that sort).” (emphasis in original)). One can also say that any 
“internalit[y]” within a person can be understood as an “externality” among different persons. See 
Hunt Allcott & Cass R. Sunstein, Regulating Internalities, 34 J. POL’Y ANALYSIS & MGMT. 698, 
700 (2015) (“It is . . . useful to think of internalities as ‘externalities that individuals impose on 
themselves.’”).  
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Trusts can contain a combination of both externally divided 
beneficiaries like the principal and income beneficiaries described 
above, and internally divided beneficiaries like the improvident 
beneficiary, or one that is not yet born.160 In such situations a trustee 
must contend with both interpersonal and intertemporal problems of 
scale. Nevertheless, all of these situations show that the trust copes with 
the same problem of scale that the class action is designed to address. 
3. The Class Attorney as the Trustee 
Under a trust model of the class action, the class attorney is 
understood as a trustee of the claims for the benefit of the class 
members. As with class members and beneficiaries, analogizing the 
class attorney to the trustee is useful because both the class attorney and 
the trustee solve the problem of scale in the same way. 
First, both the trustee and the class attorney are assigned dispositive 
control over the claims for the benefit of the class members.161 In both 
contexts, assigning dispositive control to the manager is crucial because 
it prevents the recipients from exercising control over the managed 
property at the wrong scale. 
Second, both the trustee and the class attorney are incentivized to 
dispose of the managed property at the right scale. In the class action 
context this is primarily accomplished though the attorney fee award.162 
Specifically, the fee award aligns the class attorney’s incentives with 
that of the class. Because the class attorney’s fee is typically a portion of 
the aggregate net recovery of the class members,163 the class attorney is 
incentivized (albeit imperfectly) to make investments in common issues 
that maximize the class members’ recovery as a whole. In contrast, no 
one class member or group of class members takes into account the total, 
                                                     
160. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 112 cmt. a (AM. LAW INST. 1959) (permitting a 
trust to include beneficiaries that are “capable of ascertainment from facts which although not 
existing at the time must necessarily be in existence at some time within the period of the rule 
against perpetuities”). 
161. See supra sections I.B.2 & I.B.3. 
162. Coffee, Governance, supra note 6, at 306 (“From a traditional legal perspective, the court-
awarded attorney’s fee is the principal lever by which the law seeks to incentivize the agent to act in 
the class’s interest.”). 
163. It is worth noting that a trustee may have a partial beneficial interest in the res, but not a 
complete beneficial interest. See 1 SCOTT ET AL., supra note 98, § 2.1.6 (noting that “it is possible 
for a trustee to hold an equitable interest in trust”); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 3 cmt. d 
(AM. LAW INST. 2003) (noting that “the trustee must hold property for the benefit of one or more 
persons, at least one of whom is not the sole trustee”). 
06 - Campos .docx (Do Not Delete) 12/20/2016  12:47 PM 
2016] CLASS ACTION AS TRUST 1493 
 
aggregate recovery of the class as a whole, which leads to suboptimal 
investment in common issues given economies of scale.164 
Trust law similarly relies upon structural features like trustee 
compensation to solve the problem of scale. For example, like the class 
attorney, modern developments in trust law have increased the 
discretionary power of the trustee to allow her to make investments that 
maximize the total return on the res (subject, of course, to the terms of 
the trust instrument).165 This increase in discretionary authority is often 
combined with the use of compensation methods that are based on a 
percentage of the res that align (albeit imperfectly) the interests of the 
trustee with the beneficiaries as a whole.166 Such trust compensation is 
no different from the compensation typically received by class action 
attorneys, and is similarly used to allow the trustee to invest in the res at 
the right scale. 
II. APPLICATION OF THE MODEL 
The previous part set forth a trust model of the class action. This Part 
applies the model to assess two requirements of Rule 23(b)(3) class 
actions involving damage claims: (1) each class member must have a 
right to “opt out” of the class167 and (2) the class must be cohesive.168 
The model demonstrates that neither requirement is necessary, and that, 
in fact, both are harmful to the operation of the class action. The trust 
                                                     
164. Campos, Mass Torts, supra note 24, at 1079–81; see also David Rosenberg, Mass Tort Class 
Actions: What Defendants Have and Plaintiffs Don’t, 37 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 393, 415–16 (2000) 
(using a numerical example to show the superiority of the class action to a “joint venture” that only 
aggregates a partial number of plaintiffs). 
165. See Stewart E. Sterk, Rethinking Trust Reform, How Prudent is Modern Prudent Investor 
Doctrine?, 95 CORNELL L. REV. 851, 884 (2010) (noting that recent developments in trust law 
based on modern portfolio theory, and “[t]he Restatement (Third), in particular, went out of its way 
to indicate that a trustee should have broad discretion in formulating investment strategy”). 
166. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 38 & cmt. c (AM. LAW INST. 2003) (noting that “[a] 
trustee is entitled to reasonable compensation out of the trust estate for services as trustee,” and that 
some state statutes “provide that trustees’ fees are to be based on specified percentages of the 
principal or of the income and principal of the trust”); see also Sitkoff, supra note 105, at 199 
(noting “incentive-based compensation” as one way of “ameliorating the agency problem”).  
167. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 564 U.S. 338, 362 (2011) (concluding that “individualized 
monetary claims belong in Rule 23(b)(3)” because of the “procedural protections attending the 
(b)(3) class—predominance, superiority, mandatory notice, and the right to opt out” (emphasis 
added)).  
168. Amgen, Inc. v. Conn. Ret. Plans & Trust Funds, __ U.S. __, 133 S. Ct. 1184, 1196–97 
(2013) (citing Amchem Prods., Inc. v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 591, 623 (1997) (noting that “the focus of 
the predominance inquiry under Rule 23(b)(3)” is whether “a proposed class is ‘sufficiently 
cohesive to warrant adjudication by representation’”)).  
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model also suggests potential solutions to ensure class attorney loyalty 
and to deal with class member conflicts. Indeed, unlike opt-out rights or 
cohesion requirements, these solutions are not self-defeating. 
A. Control 
1. Opt-out Rights 
A trust model of the class action demonstrates that preserving each 
class member’s control over the claim is self-defeating. This is due to a 
problem of scale that both the trust and the class action address—the 
recipients are divided in such a way that they cannot act together to 
dispose of the managed property at the right scale.169 Because there is 
not a well-developed market for managerial control in either context, 
protecting the control of the recipients only perpetuates the problem of 
scale rather than solves it.170 
Accordingly, giving class members control over their claims by 
giving them the right to opt out of the class is not only unnecessary, but 
harmful to their interests. Admittedly, opt-out rights are not harmful in 
small claims litigation, where the class members do not have an 
incentive to opt out because they lack an incentive to file suit 
separately.171 But many class actions that are certified under Rule 
23(b)(3), such as securities fraud and antitrust class actions, often have 
some class members who have large claims.172 It is in these settings that 
opt-out rights can be, and often are, harmful. 
To understand how opt-out rights are harmful, it is helpful to examine 
the arguments in favor of opt outs that are based on analogies to 
corporate law. For example, John Coffee has analogized opt-out rights to 
the exit rights of shareholders in a corporation.173 Specifically, Coffee 
has argued that opt-out rights “discipline[] class counsel by threatening 
them with reduced fees if they propose a settlement that is unattractive to 
their clients.”174 Moreover, Coffee has argued that opt outs can be used 
to mimic “takeover bids” in the corporate context by allowing for third 
parties to propose competing class actions, with class members using the 
                                                     
169. See supra section I.B.2. 
170. Id. 
171. Macey & Miller, supra note 6, at 28 n.85. 
172. Coffee, Governance, supra note 7, at 309–10, 317. 
173. Id. at 308–09; see also COFFEE, ENTREPRENEURIAL LITIGATION, supra note 7, at 83. 
174. Coffee, Accountability, supra note 6, at 421.  
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opt outs to “opt in” to the competing actions.175 Coffee admits that “an 
exact analogy cannot be drawn between the class action and corporate 
governance contexts,” but nevertheless concludes that “the idea of a 
competitive bid has considerable relevance to the class action 
context.”176 
But opt-out rights are ineffective at disciplining the class attorney 
against disloyal behavior. As an initial matter, unlike in the corporate 
context, the exercise of the opt out right cannot cause the removal of the 
class attorney. In the corporate law context, there is a market for control 
that allows third parties to acquire control rights over directors and 
officers by acquiring the stock of the shareholders. Accordingly, when a 
shareholder exits by selling her shares, she also enables a third party to 
acquire control.177 This ability to acquire control, in turn, deters the 
directors and officers from acting disloyal out of fear that a third party 
will acquire ownership and replace them.178 In contrast, the opt out right 
does not remove the class attorney. It only allows for concurrent, 
separate action. Thus, the opt out right does not provide the same threat 
of removal as in the corporate law context. 
In fact, opt-out rights are not only ineffective, but harmful due to an 
important difference between opt-out rights and corporate exit rights. A 
shareholder of a corporation who wishes to exit the corporation cannot 
liquidate her share in corporate assets.179 Thus, when a shareholder exits 
by transferring her share, the corporate assets remain under common 
control. In contrast, the right to “opt out” permits a class member to take 
her claim away from the other claims under the common control of the 
class attorney and “bring her own suit.”180 By reducing the assets under 
                                                     
175. Id. at 422–28; see also Coffee, Governance, supra note 7, at 309.  
176. Coffee, Accountability, supra note 6, at 422. 
177. For the classic account of the “market for corporate control,” see Henry G. Manne, Mergers 
and the Market for Corporate Control, 73 J. POL. ECON. 110, 112–13 (1965) (“The lower the stock 
price, relative to what it could be with more efficient management, the more attractive the take-over 
becomes to those who believe that they can manage the company more efficiently.”). 
178. Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel, The Proper Role of a Target’s Management in 
Responding to a Tender Offer, 94 HARV. L. REV. 1161, 1196 (1981) (arguing that the market for 
corporate control, “particularly the tender offer market,” “provide[s] incentives to management to 
operate efficiently and keep share prices high.”); see also id. at 1198 (“A frequent consequence of a 
successful takeover attempt is the replacement of incumbent managers.”). 
179. Henry Hansmann & Reinier Kraakman, The Essential Role of Organizational Law, 110 
YALE L.J. 387, 394 (2000) (noting that a shareholder of a corporation can only seek liquidation 
“when at least a majority of the firm’s shareholders agree”); see also Coffee, Governance, supra 
note 7, at 309 (“In the corporate context, when a dissatisfied shareholder sells shares, the 
shareholder does not withdraw capital from the corporation.”). 
180. Macey & Miller, supra note 6, at 28 n.85. 
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the control of the class attorney, the opt out has the consequence of 
“reducing . . . the attorney’s likely fee award.”181 
Coffee has argued that this liquidation feature of the opt out right is 
likely to discipline the class attorney because liquidation is “more direct, 
immediate, and painful” than corporate exit rights.182 But the liquidation 
feature of the opt out right cannot provide that discipline because a class 
attorney cannot avoid the consequences of the opt out by acting loyally. 
This is because a class member who opts out of the class action can free 
ride off of the “collective work” of the loyal class attorney, “as it usually 
enters rather quickly into the public domain through court records and 
insider leaks.”183 Accordingly, the class member would still have an 
incentive to opt out even if a class attorney was completely loyal to the 
interests of the class. Indeed, Coffee acknowledges that class members 
have significant reason to free ride off of the common benefit work of 
others in the class.184 
In fact, the liquidation feature of opt-out rights causes harm because it 
not only fails to discipline the class attorney against disloyal behavior, 
but causes disloyal behavior. This is because the potential to opt out to 
free ride off of prior investments induces class attorneys to accept 
suboptimal settlements. Again, by opting out, a class member extricates 
her claim from the others, and thus reduces the total claims on which the 
class attorney can base her percentage fee. With a reduced potential fee, 
the class attorney has less incentive to make investments in common 
issues, which, in turn, reduces the probability that the class members will 
prove those common issues and ultimately recover.185 Given the reduced 
                                                     
181. Coffee, Governance, supra note 7, at 309. 
182. Id. 
183. See Rosenberg, supra note 164, at 425 (2000) (discussing mass tort litigation); id. at 393 n.1 
(defining “mass torts” to include “contract, property, employment discrimination, antitrust, 
securities and consumer fraud, and any other common law or statutory cause of action arising from 
systematic business risk-taking and serving the social objectives of deterrence and compensation”). 
184. Coffee, Governance, supra note 7, at 336 (noting that, despite empirical evidence showing 
that parties do become representative plaintiffs, “rational parties should be reluctant to serve as the 
representative plaintiff” because they can “remain free riders and undertake no role that could give 
rise” to the costs of litigation, including the potential for adverse fee-shifting).  
185. David Rosenberg & Kathryn E. Spier, Incentives to Invest in Litigation and the Superiority 
of the Class Action, 6 J. LEG. ANALYSIS 305, 320–21 (2014) (noting that both a free-rider and a 
financing party with only a partial interest in the total recovery will not have “an incentive to spend 
more in developing work product than would be optimal to maximize his or her” own individual 
return); see also David Rosenberg, Mandatory-Litigation Class Action: The Only Option for Mass 
Tort Cases, 115 HARV. L. REV. 829, 874–75 (2002) (noting that opt outs “diminish[] plaintiffs’ 
attorneys’ opportunities to exploit litigation scale economies, thereby diluting their investment 
incentives to develop claim recovery values in the standard market process. . . . Minimizing rather 
than maximizing exit opportunities and incentives from a settlement-only class action enables the 
 
06 - Campos .docx (Do Not Delete) 12/20/2016  12:47 PM 
2016] CLASS ACTION AS TRUST 1497 
 
expected recovery, the class attorney will have an incentive to accept a 
lower settlement offer than would otherwise be accepted had there been 
no opt outs.186 Accordingly, opt-out rights make it more likely that the 
class attorney will sell out the class members, not less. 
The empirical evidence on opt outs supports the conclusion that opt 
outs lead to suboptimal settlements due to free-riding. For example, John 
Coffee notes in reviewing certain securities fraud class actions that 
“large numbers departed the class, but only following the announcement 
of the proposed class settlement,” which demonstrated that the opt outs 
“were not seeking to gain timing or other tactical advantages, which they 
would have needed to pursue at an earlier stage.”187 Coffee concludes 
from the timing of the opt outs that the class members who opted out 
“were obviously dissatisfied with the proposed settlement,” but the 
timing also strongly suggests that the opt outs planned on free-riding off 
of the work of the class attorney.188 
Moreover, empirical evidence demonstrates that high-value claims are 
more likely to opt out, which supports the inference that opt outs tend to 
dramatically reduce the class attorney’s incentives to invest.189 In some 
instances, such as in litigation involving the diet reduction drug Fen-
Phen, opt outs can completely unravel the settlement.190 This reduction 
in incentives is further supported by empirical evidence showing that 
                                                     
investing attorneys to capture greater return and commensurately increases value-creating 
investment by reducing competition from free-riders.”). 
186. Campos, Mass Torts, supra note 24, at 1116.  
187. Coffee, Governance, supra note 7, at 315–16.  
188. Id. Coffee argues that opt out class members tend to do much better than non-opt-outs, in 
some cases recovering more than the proposed settlement. Id. at 313. However, this result does not 
undermine the conclusion that opt-out rights result in suboptimal settlements. In such situations the 
class attorneys anticipate the opt outs and thus reduce their efforts accordingly, resulting in the very 
suboptimal settlement that the opt outs want to abandon. Coffee himself admits this effect, noting 
that “[l]ogically, one should assume that, when seventy percent of the claims opt out, this was not a 
complete surprise to class counsel.” Id. at 318. 
189. Eisenberg & Miller, supra note 66, at 1555 (noting that “[a]s th[e] recovery increases, so 
does the opt-out rate”); see also Campos, Mass Torts, supra note 24, at 1082 n.111 (same, citing 
Eisenberg & Miller, supra note 66); Coffee, Governance, supra note 7, at 318 (noting that, because 
of the fact that high value claims opt out of class actions, the class action becomes “the vehicle for 
compensating the residual and less sophisticated plaintiffs”). 
190. See NAGAREDA, supra note 13, at 143–47 (discussing unraveling of fen-phen settlement); 
Coffee, Governance, supra note 7, at 318 (same, noting that “90,000 persons opt[ed] out”); Lahav, 
supra note 13, at 622 (noting that opt-out rights can result in “adverse selection” which may unravel 
the class); Rosenberg & Spier, supra note 26, at 355 (noting that “there could be sufficiently strong 
opt-out incentives as to completely unravel the class action”). 
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attorneys expend much less effort in separate actions as compared to 
their efforts in class actions.191 
2. Loyalty Through Fiduciary Duties 
A trust model of the class action does more than show that providing 
a right to opt out for each class member is self-defeating. It can also 
provide guidance on how to ensure the loyalty of the class attorney. But, 
before discussing this guidance, it is worth highlighting that, unlike for 
trusts, fiduciary regulation of the manager is unlikely to be effective for 
class actions. 
As an initial matter, in both contexts the manager is regulated 
primarily through fiduciary duties, or “the threat of after-the-fact liability 
for failure to” act in “the best interests of the” beneficiaries.192 The 
source of the class attorney’s fiduciary duties is the Due Process Clause, 
which the Supreme Court has interpreted to require that class action 
procedures “fairly insure[] the protection of the interests of absent 
parties,” and that the class representative “in fact adequately 
represent[s]” the absent class members.193 Although this duty of 
adequate representation applies to the class representative, herself a class 
member, Rule 23 takes into account the de facto trustee role of the class 
attorney by separately requiring the attorney “to fairly and adequately 
represent the interests of the class.”194 
The class attorney’s duty of “adequate representation” is simply a re-
articulation of the trustee’s primary fiduciary duties of loyalty and 
care.195 The trustee’s duty of loyalty protects against “conflicts of 
interest” by “requiring a fiduciary to act in the ‘best’ or even ‘sole’ 
interests of the principal.”196 Similarly, in the class action context, courts 
have been especially vigilant in protecting class members from class 
attorneys who enter “sweetheart” settlements that benefit the attorneys at 
the class members’ expense.197 
                                                     
191. Rosenberg & Spier, supra note 26, at 346 n.87 (discussing empirical evidence). 
192. Sitkoff, supra note 105, at 201. 
193. Hansberry v. Lee, 311 U.S. 32, 42–43 (1940). 
194. FED. R. CIV. P. 23(g)(1)(B). 
195. Sitkoff, supra note 105, at 201 (“The primary fiduciary duties are loyalty and care.”). 
196. Id. 
197. See Hay & Rosenberg, supra note 3, at 1390–91 (discussing sweetheart settlements); Ortiz 
v. Fibreboard Corp., 527 U.S. 815, 852 n.30 (1999) (rejecting a class action settlement because of 
the concern that “[i]n a strictly rational world, plaintiffs’ counsel would always press for the limit of 
what the defense would pay. But with an already enormous fee within counsel’s grasp, zeal for the 
client may relax sooner than it would in a case brought on behalf of one claimant.”); Reynolds v. 
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However, trust law and class action differ as to the viability of using 
fiduciary duties to regulate the actions of the manager. In trust law, 
“[t]he agency costs-checking mechanisms of the private trust depend on 
the existence of relatively few residual claimants.”198 This is because 
“[t]he relatively smaller number of residual claimants and their relatively 
larger stakes lessens the impact of the collective action and free-rider 
dynamics.”199 Consequently, the beneficiaries in a trust have sufficient 
incentive to monitor and bring breach of fiduciary suits against the 
trustee (at least in theory). 
In contrast to the trust, the class action by definition contains 
numerous class members.200 In fact, and as noted above, the whole point 
of the class action is to prevent the collective action and free-rider 
problems that arise from the numerosity of the class members.201 
Accordingly, fiduciary regulation is unlikely to be successful in the class 
action context precisely for the same reasons why a class action is 
needed in the first place. 
The difficulty of fiduciary regulation in the class action context 
further makes it unlikely that creditors can serve as third party monitors 
of the class attorney. Arguably the most important benefit of the trust is 
asset partitioning, which prevents the trustee from using the res for her 
own personal benefit, to the detriment of both the beneficiaries and third 
party creditors.202 Trust law enforces this partitioning through the 
doctrine of “equitable tracing,” which allows a beneficiary to attach “an 
equitable lien on property transferred by the trustee to a third-party in 
breach of trust.”203 Equitable tracing, in effect, deputizes third parties to 
                                                     
Beneficial Nat’l Bank, 288 F.3d 277, 279 (7th Cir. 2002) (“The principal issue presented by these 
appeals is whether the district judge discharged the judicial duty to protect the members of a class in 
class action litigation from lawyers for the class who may, in derogation of their professional and 
fiduciary obligations, place their pecuniary self-interest ahead of that of the class. This problem, 
repeatedly remarked by judges and scholars, . . . requires district judges to exercise the highest 
degree of vigilance in scrutinizing proposed settlements of class actions.”). 
198. Sitkoff, supra note 19, at 680 (emphasis added). Of course, some trusts may have many 
beneficiaries, which, as with the class action, would reduce the utility of fiduciary duties. I thank 
Steve Urice for pointing this out to me. 
199. Id. at 679. 
200. FED. R. CIV. P. 23(a)(1) (defining the numerosity requirement). 
201. See supra section I.B.2. 
202. Hansmann & Mattei, supra note 19, at 438; see also id. at 469 (calling this in rem feature 
“the principal contribution of trust law”); Henry Hansmann & Reinier Kraakman, supra note 179, at 
416 (“This insulation of assets held in trust from the personal creditors of the trustee is the essential 
contribution of trust law.”). 
203. Sitkoff, supra note 19, at 672 (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS §§ 283–95 (AM. 
LAW INST. 1959)).  
06 - Campos .docx (Do Not Delete) 12/20/2016  12:47 PM 
1500 WASHINGTON LAW REVIEW [Vol. 91:1461 
 
monitor the trustee’s management of the res for the benefit of the 
beneficiaries. It does so by penalizing a third party who contributes to a 
trustee’s breach of her fiduciary duties.204 However, this deputizing 
effect of asset partitioning is unlikely to be effective in the class action 
context because the class members are unlikely to file suit for breaches 
of fiduciary duty. As a result, the class members are unlikely to use 
remedies like equitable tracing to induce a creditor to monitor the class 
attorney. 
3. Loyalty Through Incentives 
Despite this difference in the efficacy of fiduciary regulation, a trust 
model of the class action does suggest an additional method to ensure 
that the class attorney remains loyal to the class members. Specifically, a 
trust model of the class action provides guidance in developing a market 
for control of the class action. Again, there exists no well-developed 
market for control in either the trust or class action context. However, 
the trust model illuminates certain features of the class action that 
strongly suggest that a limited market for control would be both possible 
and beneficial. 
In the trust context, the settlor can appoint a “trust protector” who has 
“one or more powers capable of affecting what the trustees are to do 
with the trust property.”205 A trust protector is typically chosen “by the 
settlor to represent the settlor’s interests in making specified trust 
decisions that the settlor will be unable to make,” and thus can serve 
“[a]s the living embodiment of the dead settlor.”206 
In the class action context, the court similarly functions as a protector 
because federal courts view themselves as a “fiduciary for absentee 
claimants.”207 “Fiduciary” is probably the wrong term because the class 
                                                     
204. See Langbein, supra note 19, at 647–48 (concluding that equitable tracing reflects “a 
judgment about how far to impinge on outsiders to the trust deal between settlor and trustee in order 
to vindicate the deal”); Hansmann & Mattei, supra note 19, at 464 (explaining that under equitable 
tracing, “the third party transferee is almost by definition a lower-cost monitor of the [trustee’s] 
breach of duty than is the [beneficiary]”); Sitkoff, supra note 19, at 672–73 (quoting Langbein, and 
concluding that “the rule of equitable tracing appears to reflect the parties’ presumed intent in light 
of the comparative advantage of the outsider to bear the agency costs associated with this particular 
potential breach by the trustee”). 
205. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 64 cmts. b–d (AM. LAW INST. 2007). 
206. Stewart E. Sterk, Trust Protectors, Agency Costs, and Fiduciary Duty, 27 CARDOZO L. REV. 
2761, 2763 (2006). 
207. Judith Resnik, Money Matters: Judicial Market Interventions Creating Subsidies and 
Awarding Fees and Costs in Individual and Aggregate Litigation, 148 U. PA. L. REV. 2119, 2127–
28 (2000) (“In the context of aggregation, judges have long claimed for themselves another role, 
that of fiduciary for absentee claimants.”). 
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attorney is clearly the fiduciary of the class members. Nevertheless, 
courts have self-consciously considered themselves “protector[s] of class 
interests”208 and often exercise similar administrative duties like 
removing the class attorney.209 This protector function is typically 
invoked when a class action settlement is proposed.210 This is because all 
class action settlements require approval from the court after a fairness 
hearing.211 During such hearings, judges assume a “judicial duty to 
protect the members of a class in class action litigation from lawyers for 
the class who may, in derogation of their professional and fiduciary 
obligations, place their pecuniary self-interest ahead of that of the 
class.”212 
The class action can take advantage of the protector function of the 
court by using it to create a market for control. Specifically, during the 
fairness hearing for a class action settlement the court, as protector, can 
invite bids for control of the class action. In bidding, a third party (such 
as an insurer, a hedge fund, or a class member herself) would offer to 
buy the claims outright and to have the discretion either to negotiate a 
new settlement or litigate the claims directly. The proceeds could then be 
used to compensate the class members, and the original class attorney 
can receive a set percentage fee. The court, as protector, would oversee 
the entire bid process and monitor the bidders to avoid collusion. In fact, 
state courts have already experimented with permitting settlement 
“objectors” to make bids to purchase the claims outright for an amount 
greater than the settlement.213 
Creating such a market for control through an auction procedure has 
been proposed before.214 The trust model is useful because it illuminates 
                                                     
208. See In re “Agent Orange” Prod. Liab. Litig., 818 F.2d 216, 223 (2d Cir. 1987) (discussing 
this protector role in the context of “its role of assuring reasonableness in the awarding of fees in 
equitable fund cases”). 
209. See Eubank v. Pella Corp., 753 F.3d 718, 724, 729 (7th Cir. 2014) (concluding that class 
counsel “was unfit to represent the class” and ordering his removal as class counsel). 
210. Reynolds v. Beneficial Nat’l Bank, 288 F.3d 277, 280 (7th Cir. 2002) (“[T]he district judge 
in the settlement phase of a class action suit [is] a fiduciary of the class, who is subject therefore to 
the high duty of care that the law requires of fiduciaries.”). 
211. FED. R. CIV. P. 23(e) (discussing fairness hearings).  
212. Reynolds, 288 F.3d at 279; see also 4 WILLIAM B. RUBENSTEIN ET AL., NEWBERG ON CLASS 
ACTIONS § 13.40 (5th ed. 2014) (discussing the fiduciary duty of the court in reviewing a class 
action settlement during a fairness hearing). 
213. See, e.g., Forsythe v. ESC Fund Mgmt. Co., No. 1091-VCL, 2012 WL 1655538, at *2 (Del. 
Ch. May 9, 2012) (approving a class action settlement as fair “unless the objectors make the 
equivalent of a topping bid”). 
214. For a recent and much more comprehensive proposal to auction control at the settlement 
fairness hearing, see Jay Tidmarsh, Auctioning Class Settlements, 56 WM. & MARY L. REV. 227 
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the role of the court as a protector in making the market and ultimately 
conducting the sale. This is an advantage that is absent in the market for 
corporate control. In that market, the corporate managers can obstruct 
takeovers through a variety of methods.215 In contrast, the court, as 
protector, decides to whom (and whether) to sell the claims, and in doing 
so can prevent the original class attorney from entrenching herself. 
A trust model is further useful because it suggests a way to create a 
market for control without providing control rights to the class members, 
which again, they cannot exercise optimally.216 Thus, the trust model 
allows the class action to take advantage of the best of both the trust and 
corporate worlds. The class action can still retain managerial control 
over the claims with the class attorney while enabling the court, as 
protector, to facilitate a market for control. In this way, the class attorney 
can provide the scale advantages of common ownership while the class 
members would retain the advantages of the market for control. 
Indeed, unlike providing opt-out rights, which would result in 
suboptimal investment and free-riding, selling the claims in toto would 
have the advantage of “replacing a party whose interest is only in the 
profits flowing from the award of fees . . . with a party with a bona fide 
interest in maximizing the net return to the claim for a party.”217 
Moreover, the use of a protector and a common manager to sell control 
in the class action context avoids the problems of free-riding that can 
occur in the corporate context when tender offers for control are made 
for a company with a large number of dispersed shareholders.218 It does 
                                                     
(2014). Macey and Miller have proposed an auction of the class members’ claims upon the filing of 
the class action, which would have the advantage of disbursing funds immediately to the class 
members. Macey & Miller, supra note 6, at 105–08 (holding the auction during the fairness hearing 
has one advantage over auctioning the case at filing). But auctioning off control at the settlement 
fairness hearing reduces the information costs of the court because the proposed settlement would 
set the minimum bid, while a court holding an auction at filing would, in some cases, have to “state 
a minimum bid in order to prevent an excessively low sale price.” Id. at 107. 
215. Guhan Subramanian, Bargaining in the Shadow of Takeover Defenses, 113 YALE L.J. 621, 
33–35 (2003) (discussing and criticizing theory that management should threaten obstruction in bids 
because “management knows better”); Lucian Bebchuk, The Case for Facilitating Competing 
Tender Offers, 95 HARV. L. REV. 1028, 1029 (1982) (discussing and criticizing such obstruction). 
216. This is one difference between my proposal and the comprehensive proposal for class 
settlement auctions provided by Jay Tidmarsh. Tidmarsh allows for opt-out rights, while I do not 
because of the harm they cause to class attorney loyalty. See Tidmarsh, supra note 214, at 264–65 
(discussing the timing of opt outs). 
217. Macey & Miller, supra note 6, at 110; see also Sitkoff, supra note 19, at 637 (making the 
same point in discussing trusts). 
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so by initially vesting collective control in the class attorney to invest 
and develop the claims, and then selling the claims in the aggregate with 
the settlement amount as the minimum bid. 
Designing such a market for control at the settlement stage would 
require important design considerations to avoid the problems generally 
associated with auctions, such as collusive bidding.219 However, the 
existence of the court as protector strongly suggests that these problems 
are not fatal, and thus “do not refute the desirability of experimenting 
with an auction approach.”220 
One concern worth addressing is the risk that such a market for 
control would reduce the incentive of a class attorney to develop the 
claims in the first place “by threatening to deprive [her] of any benefit 
from [her] research into the case.”221 This is also a significant concern 
for tender offers in the corporate law context.222 However, the concern 
with reducing incentives to bring class actions is unlikely to surface in 
the market proposed here, because, in the settlement context, the class 
attorney would receive the same percentage fee she would have received 
from the settlement itself. Accordingly, the class attorney would be 
compensated for initial work and would maintain the same incentives to 
invest in common issues she would have had in the absence of such an 
auction procedure. 
4. Due Process 
The concern with protecting litigant autonomy, however, is ultimately 
not based on the utility of procedures like the opt out to police class 
attorneys. Instead, it is based on a more fundamental belief that as a 
                                                     
218. See Bebchuk, supra note 130, at 958 (citing Sanford J. Grossman & Oliver D. Hart, 
Takeover Bids, the Free-Rider Problem, and the Theory of the Corporation, 11 BELL J. ECON. 42 
(1980)) (“The free-rider problem may prevent a takeover from taking place even if it would be 
efficient.”); Grossman & Hart, supra.  
219. Macey & Miller, supra note 6, at 111. 
220. Id. at 110 (concluding that the difficulties associated with an auction approach “are not 
insurmountable and do not refute the desirability of experimenting with an auction approach”). 
221. See id. at 114 (noting that “[a]n auction approach could deter first movers by threatening to 
deprive them of any benefit from their research into the case”); John C. Coffee, Understanding the 
Plaintiff’s Attorney: The Implications of Economic Theory for Private Enforcement of Law Through 
Class and Derivative Actions, 86 COLUM. L. REV. 669, 692 (1986) (arguing that in an auction 
procedure “[t]he entrepreneurially motivated attorney who suspects that a legal violation has 
occurred would have a reduced incentive to investigate further because, even if a violation is 
discovered, the attorney would still have to outbid others in order to profit from this effort”).  
222. See Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel, Auctions and Sunk Costs in Tender Offers, 
35 STAN. L. REV. 1 (1982) (arguing that auctions chill first bidders and acquisitions more 
generally). 
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normative matter, class members should have control over their claims. 
Coffee himself is quite explicit about this when he states that his 
“normative position” is “to facilitate client autonomy” rather than “the 
‘best interests’ of the class (however determined).”223 
The Supreme Court has also suggested that the opt out right is 
valuable in itself as a matter of due process. This due process concern 
with opt-out rights arose prominently in Ortiz v. Fibreboard Corp.,224 
where the Court vacated a global class action settlement of asbestos 
claims because, among other things, the class action was certified under 
Rule 23(b)(1)(B), which affords the class members no notice or 
opportunity to opt out.225 The Court concluded that the lack of opt-out 
rights was unfair because “objectors to the collectivism of a mandatory 
subdivision (b)(1)(B) action have no inherent right to abstain.”226 
Indeed, the Ortiz Court suggested, without holding, that the failure of 
the class action to provide notice and opt-out rights to the class members 
raised serious due process concerns.227 The Court noted in particular that 
without notice and a right to opt out, “[t]he legal rights of absent class 
members . . . are resolved regardless of either their consent, or, in a class 
with objectors, their express wish to the contrary.”228 Recently, the Court 
has strongly suggested that opt-out rights are required as a matter of due 
process in a variety of contexts, from class action decisions 
themselves229 to decisions involving the Erie doctrine230 and 
arbitration.231 
                                                     
223. Coffee, Accountability, supra note 6, at 380. 
224. 527 U.S. 815 (1999). 
225. Id. at 844–45; see also FED. R. CIV. P. 23(c)(2)(A) (providing that for class actions certified 
under (b)(1) and (b)(2), the court “may direct appropriate notice to the class” but is not required to 
do so). 
226. Ortiz, 527 U.S. at 846–47 (emphasis added). 
227. Id. at 846–48. 
228. Id. at 847–48. 
229. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 564 U.S. 338, 363 (2011) (questioning whether procedural 
due process permits a mandatory class action for claims seeking injunctive relief, noting as an aside 
that such class actions are permitted under Rule 23(b)(2), “rightly or wrongly”). 
230. Shady Grove Orthopedic Assocs. v. Allstate Ins. Co., __ U.S. __, 130 S. Ct. 1431, 1443 
(2010) (upholding Rule 23 class actions against Erie and Rules Enabling Act challenges so long as 
the class actions involve “willing” plaintiffs). 
231. AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepción, __ U.S. __, 131 S. Ct. 1740, 1751 (2011) (citing 
Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Shutts, 472 U.S. 797, 811–12 (1985)) (affirming the validity of class 
action waivers in arbitration agreements and noting that “[f]or a class-action money judgment to 
bind absentees in litigation . . . absent members must be afforded notice, an opportunity to be heard, 
and a right to opt out of the class”). 
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But the taking away of control should not violate due process because 
it is necessary to ensure that the plaintiffs’ claims are, in fact, properly 
developed. In other words, due process does not require the protection of 
procedural rights like litigant autonomy when those procedural rights 
would actually harm the plaintiffs’ entitlements rather than protect them. 
I have addressed the due process issues surrounding litigant autonomy 
and the opt-out right in great detail in a previous article.232 Here I want 
to briefly note that trust law is not only instructive, but has been 
instructive. In Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co.,233 the 
Court reviewed a New York state law which permitted small trusts to 
invest in “common fund trusts” for common administration.234 Under 
New York law, such common fund trusts were subject to periodic 
“accountings” which settled “all questions respecting the management of 
the common fund.”235 Although the decrees permitted any claim against 
the administrator of the common-fund trust, those with a potential claim 
only received newspaper notice of the proceedings.236 
Among other things, the Court concluded that newspaper notice was 
sufficient for individuals who could not be located or identified. This is 
because “[t]he expense of keeping” those with such interests “informed 
from day to day of substitutions . . . would impose a severe burden on 
the plan, and would likely dissipate its advantages.”237 Accordingly, the 
Court had “no doubt that such impracticable and extended searches are 
not required in the name of due process.”238 
In essence, the Mullane Court concluded that due process does not 
require procedural rights like individualized notice when such rights 
would destroy the substantive rights that they were meant to protect. In 
other words, Mullane, a trust case, stands for the proposition that 
procedural rights are not required as a matter of due process when they 
are self-defeating. Consequently, rights like an opportunity to opt out are 
not required as a matter of due process in class actions because they 
would be similarly self-defeating for class members. 
                                                     
232. See Campos, Mass Torts, supra note 24. 
233. 339 U.S. 306 (1950) 
234. Id. at 307–09. 
235. Id. at 311. 
236. See id. at 309–10. 
237. Id. at 318 (emphasis added). 
238. Id. 
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B. Conflicts 
1. Class Cohesion 
Along with opt-out rights, the Supreme Court has also insisted on the 
class members being “cohesive” to ensure that “the use of the class 
action device” is not “unfair.”239 The Court first expressed its concern 
with class cohesion in Amchem Products v. Windsor,240 which involved 
a global settlement of “current and future asbestos-related claims” 
brought against a consortium of former asbestos manufacturers.241 
Among other things, the settlement “devis[ed] an administrative scheme 
for [the] disposition of asbestos claims not yet in litigation.”242 Thus, the 
settlement not only covered those with present asbestos-related injuries, 
but those who had been exposed to asbestos but had yet to manifest any 
injury.243 The settlement was included with a motion to certify the class, 
and the district court approved both.244 The Third Circuit, however, 
vacated the class certification.245 
The Supreme Court agreed with the Third Circuit. The Court 
concluded that the class certification was improper because, among other 
things, the plaintiffs failed to show that “the questions of law or fact 
common to class members predominate over any questions affecting 
only individual members,” as required under Rule 23(b)(3).246 
According to the Court, the “predominance inquiry tests whether 
proposed classes are sufficiently cohesive to warrant adjudication by 
representation.”247 The Court found no predominance of common issues 
because the purported class members differed significantly as to a 
number of issues of law and fact, such as the products they were exposed 
                                                     
239. Amgen, Inc. v. Conn. Ret. Plans & Trust Funds, __ U.S. __, 133 S. Ct. 1184, 1196–97 
(2013) (noting that “the focus of the predominance inquiry under Rule 23(b)(3)” is whether “a 
proposed class is ‘sufficiently cohesive to warrant adjudication by representation,’” (citing Amchem 
Prods., Inc. v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 591, 623 (1997)); Comcast Corp. v. Behrend, __ U.S. __, 133 S. 
Ct. 1426, 1436 (2012) (same). 
240. 521 U.S. 591 (1997). 
241. Id. at 599–601. 
242. Id. at 601. 
243. Id. at 602–05 (describing the settlement). 
244. Id. at 606. 
245. Id. at 608. 
246. Id. at 622; see also FED. R. CIV. P. 23(b)(3) (setting forth the predominance requirement). 
247. Id. at 623 (citations omitted & emphasis added). 
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to, the timing of each exposure, and the diseases or other injuries each 
class member suffered.248 
Along with failing to satisfy predominance, the proposed class action 
also failed to satisfy the “adequacy of representation” requirement under 
Rule 23(a)(4).249 The Court emphasized, in particular, that “for the 
currently injured, the critical goal is generous immediate payments. That 
goal tugs against the interest of exposure-only plaintiffs in ensuring an 
ample, inflation-protected fund for the future.”250 Scholars have also 
expressed a similar concern with those conflicts “that give rise to a 
significant potential for negotiation on behalf of an undifferentiated class 
to skew in some predictable way the design of class-settlement terms in 
favor of one or another subgroup for reasons unrelated to evaluation of 
the relevant claims.”251 
As with opt-out rights, the trust model of the class action shows that 
the class cohesion requirement is both unnecessary and harmful. As 
noted above, both the class action and the trust are used in situations 
where the recipients lack either the ability or the motivation to dispose of 
the managed property at the appropriate scale.252 One primary cause for 
this inability to invest at the right scale is the existence of conflicting 
interests among the recipients. For example, income beneficiaries and 
principal beneficiaries can, and often do, conflict over investments that 
may increase the res as a whole but may decrease either the income or 
the principal.253 The conflict between the principal beneficiary and the 
income beneficiary—“the tension between capital appreciation and 
income production”—is not materially different from the conflict 
between the futures and presents in Amchem.254 Thus, unlike other forms 
of organizational law, “trust law facilitates the creation of residual 
claimants with interests adverse to each other”255 because it seeks to 
alleviate the suboptimal investment and management that arises from 
those conflicts. 
                                                     
248. Id. at 624 (quoting Georgine v. Amchem Prods., Inc., 83 F.3d 610, 626 (3d Cir. 1996)) 
(“Class members were exposed to different asbestos-containing products, for different amounts of 
time, in different ways, and over different periods.”). 
249. Id. at 625. 
250. Id. at 626. 
251. Issacharoff & Nagareda, supra note 4, at 1684 (discussing Amchem, 521 U.S. 591); see also 
ALI, PRINCIPLES, supra note 12, § 2.07 reporters’ notes cmt. d, at 158 (highlighting “commentary 
conceptualizing adequate representation in class actions in terms of structural conflicts of interest”). 
252. See supra section I.B.2.  
253. See supra section I.B.2. 
254. Sitkoff, supra note 19, at 653. 
255. Id. at 650 (emphasis added). 
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Accordingly, the insistence on class cohesion is harmful because it 
prevents the use of the class action in many settings where the class 
action is necessary to solve a problem of scale. For example, in mass tort 
litigation like the asbestos litigation at the heart of Amchem, conflicts 
among the class members are pervasive because of the heterogeneity of 
the injuries the class members suffer.256 As a result, in the aftermath of 
Amchem and its insistence on class cohesion, “the class action has fallen 
in disfavor as a means for resolving mass-tort claims.”257 
But the trust model of the class action shows that these conflicts 
suggest just the opposite—that the class action should be especially 
favored in mass tort litigation. First, the Amchem Court fails to consider 
the far worse alternatives to using the class action in mass tort 
litigation.258 The alternative to a class action in cases like Amchem 
would be separate lawsuits, which would allow the present plaintiffs to 
exhaust all of the recoverable proceeds from the defendants before the 
future plaintiffs even have a chance to file suit.259 The Amchem Court 
hinted at this possibility. It noted that while the case did not involve a 
“limited fund,” “the terms of the settlement reflect essential allocation 
decisions designed to confine compensation and limit defendants’ 
liability.”260 Consequently, the Amchem Court expressed a real concern 
that the present plaintiffs would exhaust compensation to the detriment 
of the future plaintiffs. Moreover, the Amchem Court failed to note that, 
unlike the present plaintiffs, the class attorney would be motivated to 
enlarge the amount of recovery as a whole because her fee was based on 
the total net settlement amount.261 Thus, the class attorney would act for 
the benefit of all the class members equally, not just the present 
plaintiffs. 
More importantly, the class action is particularly necessary in mass 
tort litigation because mass tort plaintiffs suffer the same problem of 
                                                     
256. See Coffee, Accountability, supra note 6, at 385–86 (noting while discussing mass tort 
litigation that the conflicts are pervasive because “[w]henever the injuries suffered by class 
members are relatively heterogeneous, internal conflicts necessarily arise.”); Coffee, Governance, 
supra note 7, at 318 (noting that “in mass tort cases, the variation in claim value can be particularly 
great, based on the highly variable physical injuries suffered by the plaintiffs”). 
257. ALI, PRINCIPLES, supra note 12, § 1.02, at 25.  
258. This is ironic because Rule 23(b)(3) requires a court to determine whether “a class action is 
superior to other available methods for fairly and efficiently adjudicating the controversy.” FED. R. 
CIV. P. 23(b)(3). 
259. Campos, Mass Torts, supra note 24, at 1115. 
260. Amchem Prods., Inc. v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 591, 627 (1997). 
261. The Court noted that the class attorneys would “receive attorneys’ fees in an amount to be 
approved by the District Court,” but did not specify how the fees would be calculated. Id. at 605.  
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scale that plagues small claims litigation, but with far worse 
consequences.262 Like the small claims plaintiffs, mass tort plaintiffs are 
numerous and share common issues of liability that would benefit from 
the cost sharing and economies of scale provided by the class action.263 
Admittedly, unlike small claims plaintiffs, and as exemplified by 
Amchem, mass tort plaintiffs vary significantly as to their individual net 
expected recoveries. Thus, some mass torts plaintiffs may have an 
individual incentive to bring suit, resulting in some investment in 
common issues.264 However, this high variance makes it more likely that 
the plaintiffs will resist aggregate treatment. This is because plaintiffs 
with high value claims have an incentive to avoid aggregation in order to 
free ride, thus causing plaintiffs with low value claims to have a much 
lower expected recovery or to not file at all.265 
Second, the absence of a class action in the mass tort context leads to 
far worse results. As with small claims litigation, the result of the mass 
torts plaintiffs’ resistance to aggregation is that the defendant will not 
have liability optimally imposed on them, leading them to take less care. 
In other words, like the small claims plaintiffs, the mass torts plaintiffs’ 
resistance to aggregation leads to the very mass torts they suffered.266 
However, mass torts plaintiffs suffer a much greater cost for this loss 
in deterrence than small claims plaintiffs. For plaintiffs in small claims 
                                                     
262. See Campos, Mass Torts, supra note 24, at 1081–85 (arguing that small claims plaintiffs and 
mass tort plaintiffs both suffer from the problem of asymmetric stakes). 
263. See Deborah R. Hensler & Mark A. Peterson, Understanding Mass Personal Injury 
Litigation: A Socio-Legal Analysis, 59 BROOK. L. REV. 961, 966 (1993) (noting that “the 
commonality of issues and actors among individual mass tort claims” distinguishes mass torts from 
“automobile accident” and other “high volume” litigation). 
264. See Campos, Mass Torts, supra note 24, at 1081–85. But see Rosenberg & Spier, supra note 
26, at 344 (“Even if fixed-cost barriers were removed, virtually any claim that turned on variable 
cost investments—that is, all claims that present some litigable common question—would 
nonetheless stand a good chance of being rendered worthless.”). 
265. Campos, Mass Torts, supra note 24, at 1082 (noting that in mass tort litigation, “there may 
be plaintiffs who are better off suing separately than joining the collective”); Coffee, Governance, 
supra note 7, at 318 (noting that due to opt outs, “the class action in the mass tort context became 
the repository for two categories of plaintiffs: (a) those whose claims either had evidentiary, factual, 
or legal problems that made it undesirable to proceed individually; and (b) future claimants who had 
not yet sustained injury”). 
266. There is a paucity of empirical evidence of the effect of procedures like the class action on 
the deterrence of mass torts. However, the available evidence does show “persuasively . . . that tort 
law achieves something significant in encouraging safety,” albeit imperfectly. Gary T. Schwartz, 
Reality in the Economic Analysis of Tort Law: Does Tort Law Really Deter?, 42 UCLA L. REV. 
377, 423 (1994) (discussing different sectors of tort liability). This evidence of the imperfect 
deterrence function of tort law is supportive of the view that one source of the imperfection is the 
restriction on the use of class actions. However, admittedly, more work must be done to study this 
effect and to rule out alternatives. 
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consumer or products cases, the nonpecuniary losses are either 
nonexistent (e.g., the only loss is an easily replaceable washer), or very 
small (e.g., the smell of the washer). In contrast, mass tort plaintiffs 
typically suffer from such nonpecuniary injuries as cancer or death, 
which no amount of damages can ever replace.267 Thus, the costs of 
failing to certify class actions in mass torts litigation make mass tort 
plaintiffs especially vulnerable. 
Finally, it is worth noting that an increase in mass torts from a failure 
to aggregate is more likely than in small claims litigation. Unlike in 
small claims cases, where the plaintiffs are typically consumers of the 
defendants’ products, the plaintiffs in mass tort cases rarely have an 
opportunity, apart from insurance subrogation, to aggregate ex ante.268 In 
addition, in many mass tort situations there are not sufficient alternative 
regulatory schemes to prevent the tort.269 
2. Issue Class Actions 
The trust model of the class action shows that the class cohesion 
requirement is harmful because it prevents the use of the class action in 
situations like mass tort litigation where, due to conflicts, the problem of 
scale is especially acute. But the trust model also provides guidance in 
resolving the problem of scale caused by class member conflicts. 
As noted earlier, trust law permits conflicts among the beneficiaries, 
such as trusts where one beneficiary has an interest in the principal of 
the res while another has an interest in the income produced by the 
res.270 To deal with such situations, recent developments in trust law 
permit a trustee to focus on the total return on the res271 while granting 
the trustee the power to “adjust between principal and income to the 
extent the trustee considers necessary.”272 Permitting such powers of 
                                                     
267. Campos, Mass Torts, supra note 24, at 1085. 
268. See David Rosenberg, Deregulating Insurance Subrogation: Towards an Ex Ante Market in 
Tort Claims (2000) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with the Harvard Law School Library). 
269. See Campos, Mass Torts, supra note 24, at 1077 n.78 (noting insufficiency of alternatives); 
Rosenberg, supra note 185, at 896–97 (arguing in favor of mandatory class actions for mass torts 
because “[r]egulatory and market alternatives that collectivize mass tort cases on a less 
comprehensive and less compulsory basis fail to take full advantage of scale economies and 
possibilities for redistributing claim-generated wealth”). 
270. See supra section I.B.2. 
271. See UNIF. PRUDENT INV’R ACT § 2(b) (1994) (“A trustee’s investment and management 
decisions respecting individual assets must be evaluated not in isolation but in the context of the 
trust portfolio as a whole.”); id. cmt. (“In the trust setting the term ‘portfolio’ embraces the entire 
trust estate.”). 
272. UNIF. PRINCIPAL & INCOME ACT § 104(a) (1997). 
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equitable adjustment are designed to “authorize[] the trustee to make 
adjustments between principal and income that may be necessary if the 
income component of a portfolio’s total return is too small or too large 
because of investment decisions made by the trustee.”273 Thus trust law 
allows a trustee to maximize the total res, and then equitably distribute 
the proceeds afterwards to satisfy each beneficiary’s partial share. 
The class action can also separate total return investing in the claims 
from equitable distribution of the proceeds by utilizing issue class 
actions. Rule 23 allows for class actions “with respect to particular 
issues,” but only “[w]hen appropriate.”274 Despite this provision, some 
courts, most notably the Fifth Circuit, initially expressed disapproval of 
issue class actions because such class actions would “eviscerate the 
predominance requirement of rule 23(b)(3); the result would be 
automatic certification in every case where there is a common issue, a 
result that could not have been intended.”275 
However, issue class actions have recently gained support from both 
courts and scholars. For example, the ALI’s Principles of the Law of 
Aggregate Litigation has endorsed the use of issue class actions so long 
as such a class action “materially advances the disposition of the 
litigation as a whole,”276 and some courts have acknowledged that “it [is] 
more efficient” for such common issues “to be resolved in a single 
proceeding than for [each issue] to be litigated separately in hundreds of 
different trials.”277 Moreover, some state courts have also permitted 
                                                     
273. Id. § 104 cmt.; see also RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 111(b) (AM. LAW INST. 2012) 
(requiring trustee to “make an equitable adjustment” if necessary to comply with duty of 
impartiality as to principal and income beneficiaries). 
274. FED. R. CIV. P. 23(c)(4). Alternatively, a court could certify a class action, but later decertify 
the class after all common issues are adjudicated. State courts, following federal practice, have 
experimented with this “decertification” procedure, which, in effect, creates an ex post issue class 
action. See Engle v. Liggett Grp., Inc., 945 So. 2d 1246, 1269 (Fla. 2006) (concluding that such 
decertification was not an abuse of discretion, citing federal cases). 
275. Castano v. Am. Tobacco Co., 84 F.3d 734, 745 n.21 (5th Cir. 1996); see also ALI, 
PRINCIPLES, supra note 12, § 2.02 reporters’ notes cmt. a at 94 (noting that “[c]ourts are divided 
over the precise relationship between the predominance requirement of Rule 23(b)(3) and the 
authorization for issue classes in Rule 23(c)(4)”). 
276. FED. JUDICIAL CTR., MANUAL FOR COMPLEX LITIGATION (FOURTH) § 21.24, at 273 (2004); 
see also McLaughlin v. Am. Tobacco Co., 522 F.3d 215, 234 (2d Cir. 2008), overruled on other 
grounds sub nom, Bridge v. Phoenix Bond & Indem. Co., 553 U.S. 639 (2008) (concluding that an 
issue class action was not appropriate because it would not “materially advance the litigation”); 
ALI, PRINCIPLES, supra note 12, § 2.02(a)(1) (recommending that a court “should exercise 
discretion to authorize aggregate treatment of a common issue by way of a class action if the court 
determines that resolution of the common issue would materially advance the resolution of multiple 
[] claims by addressing the core of the dispute . . . .”). 
277. Butler v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 727 F.3d 796, 799 (7th Cir. 2013). 
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issue class actions as “[t]he pragmatic solution” in some situations, 
citing federal case law on Rule 23 issue class actions.278 In fact, the Fifth 
Circuit has since relaxed its position on issue class actions.279 
Indeed, issue class actions have the added benefit of preventing the 
class attorney from influencing the distribution of damages. As noted 
earlier, the trustee has discretion to re-characterize the total return of the 
res to allow for an equitable distribution of proceeds to beneficiaries 
with conflicting interests.280 In addition, trust law imposes a duty on the 
trustee to treat the beneficiaries impartially.281 This duty is a corollary to 
the facilitation of conflicts in trusts, and thus, like conflicts, the duty is 
“a salient distinguishing characteristic of trust law as organizational 
law.”282 In fact, the duty of impartiality makes trust law a particularly apt 
analogy to class actions because a class attorney’s duty to adequately 
represent the class also includes a duty to treat the class members 
impartially.283 
But enforcing such a duty of impartiality in the class action context 
(and, arguably, in many trust contexts) is difficult because the class 
                                                     
278. Engle, 945 So. 2d at 1269–70 (concluding that trial court did not abuse its discretion in 
certifying a class action trial on common issues of liability). 
279. See Mullen v. Treasure Chest Casino, LLC, 186 F.3d 620, 628–29 (5th Cir. 1999) 
(permitting an issue class action, distinguishing Castano, 84 F.3d 734, because Castano presented a 
risk that a second jury would re-examine a previously decided common issue in violation of the 
Seventh Amendment’s Re-examination Clause); Engle, 945 So. 2d at 1270 (noting that the Fifth 
Circuit has relaxed its position on issue class actions, citing Mullen, 186 F.3d 620). Avoiding such 
Seventh Amendment issues would be relatively easy to accomplish, and thus would not pose any 
problem to the certification of the issue class actions discussed here. In essence, common issues of 
liability arise from the defendant’s ex ante behavior, while individual issues arise from the effect of 
that behavior on the plaintiffs ex post. See Elizabeth Chamblee Burch, Constructing Issue Class 
Actions, 101 VA. L. REV. 1855 (2015). Accordingly, common issues of fact can easily be separated 
from individual issues of fact because the issues arise from two different points in time. See 
Campos, Mass Torts, supra note 24, at 1073. 
280. See UNIF. PRINCIPAL & INCOME ACT § 104 cmt. (1997) (noting that “the purpose of the 
power to adjust in Section 104(a) is to eliminate the need for a trustee who operates under the 
prudent investor rule to be concerned about the income component of the portfolio’s total return”). 
281. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 183 (AM. LAW INST. 1959) (“When there are two or 
more beneficiaries of a trust, the trustee is under a duty to deal impartially with them.”). 
282. Sitkoff, supra note 19, at 652; see also Steven L. Schwarcz, Commercial Trusts as Business 
Organizations: An Invitation to Comparatists, 13 DUKE J. COMP. & INT’L L. 321, 329–30 (2003) 
(noting that, unlike in other organizational forms, “trust law imposes a duty of impartiality”). 
283. See Dechert v. Cadle Co., 333 F.3d 801, 803 (7th Cir. 2003) (noting in a bankruptcy case 
that in “the usual class action” the class representative has a “fiduciary duty as class 
representative . . . to represent all members of the class equally”). Cf. Lahav, supra note 13, at 594 
(noting that “[i]n the absence of other, competing goals (such as decentralized adjudicators or the 
right to a jury trial), it is a general principle of law that similar cases ought to reach similar 
outcomes,” although “[d]octrinally, the principle requiring equality of outcomes is weakly 
supported”). 
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attorney is indifferent to the distribution of any recovery. Again, the 
class attorney solves the problem of scale among the class members by 
having a fee that is tied to the aggregate recovery of the claims as a 
whole.284 Accordingly, the class attorney has an incentive to exploit 
economies of scale in investing in common issues.285 However, no such 
economies arise in issues that are unique to each individual class 
member because the issues lack any spillover benefits for other class 
members.286 Thus, the class attorney does not care how that recovery is 
later parceled out to each class member, or even if it goes to the class 
members at all.287 
Consequently, the use of issue class actions has the benefit of 
ensuring impartiality because it would prevent distributional issues from 
being influenced by the indifference of the class attorney. Because an 
issue class action allows the class attorney to focus solely on the “total 
return” of the claims, which is the only thing she is incentivized to care 
about, distribution is safely kept away from the attorney. Moreover, the 
issue class action allows the class members to retain some control over 
their claims while avoiding the problems of scale that arise when 
common issues are present.288 Indeed, issue class actions would avoid 
the inaccuracies that would arise from recharacterizing proceeds. This is 
because “damages recovery [can] proceed[] strictly in accordance with 
accepted evidentiary standards” and thus limit recovery only to “specific 
losses suffered by class members.”289 
                                                     
284. See supra section I.B.3. 
285. See supra section I.B.3. 
286. Rosenberg & Spier, supra note 26, at 314 (noting that issues that are not common to the 
class lack “spillovers” and thus “plaintiffs cannot benefit from centralized investment decisions”). 
287. See In re Baby Prods. Antitrust Litig., 708 F.3d 163, 178 (3d Cir. 2013) (noting that 
“awarding attorneys’ fees based on the entire settlement amount rather than individual distributions 
creates a potential conflict of interest between absent class members and their counsel” because the 
class attorney is indifferent to how the amount is distributed while “[c]lass members are not 
indifferent to whether funds are distributed to them or to cy pres recipients”); Int’l Precious Metals 
Corp. v. Waters, 530 U.S. 1223, 1224 (2000) (O’Connor, J.) (denying cert. and criticizing class 
action settlement that awarded the class attorneys a percentage of the total settlement amount, but 
reverted some of the amount back to the defendant, noting that “[a]rrangements such as 
[these] . . . decouple class counsel’s financial incentives from those of the class”); Tidmarsh, supra 
note 22, at 1193 (noting that “a self-interested class counsel . . . is ultimately indifferent to the 
distribution of the remedy”). 
288. See Campos, Mass Torts, supra note 24, at 1111 (“[A] plaintiff may still have her ‘day in 
court’ in the context of a bifurcated class action with a common-issue proceeding and individual-
issue determinations.”). 
289. 3 WILLIAM B. RUBENSTEIN ET AL., NEWBERG ON CLASS ACTIONS § 10:17, at 517 (4th ed. 
2002). For an example of litigation with a common issue class action coupled with each class 
member bringing separate claims to prove individual issues, see Engle v. Liggett Grp., Inc., 945 So. 
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3. Scheduling and Sampling 
Although issue class actions allow a class attorney to avoid 
distributional issues, and thus remain impartial to the class members, 
such class actions may undermine impartiality in two circumstances. 
First, in situations where there is a limited (or near limited) fund like in 
Amchem, it may make sense for the Court to introduce a distribution 
procedure that prevents the exhaustion of the fund.290 Second, in 
situations where proving individual damages is costly, it may make 
sense to use a procedure of distribution that relaxes evidentiary 
requirements to allow more class members to recover.291 
Again, trust law, which also must contend with “the problem of 
balancing the interests of residual claimants of different classes,”292 is 
instructive. As noted earlier, in dealing with income and principal 
beneficiaries, recent developments in trust law permit the trustee to 
make equitable adjustments, including the power to reclassify proceeds 
(e.g., classifying “income” as “principal”) to fairly distribute the 
proceeds.293 Trust law also permits the use of the “unitrust,” which 
“abolishes the distinction between income and principal” by directing 
“[t]he unitrust trustee [to] pay[] out not traditional income, which is 
determined formalistically, but a fixed percentage of the portfolio, which 
is measured periodically.”294 Like equitable adjustment, the unitrust 
improves fairness among the principal and income beneficiaries.295 But 
the unitrust further reduces the costs of distribution considerably by 
defining a mechanical formula for distributing the proceeds.296 
                                                     
2d 1246, 1256–58 (Fla. 2006) (describing a “three phase[]” trial plan with a common issue class 
action phase and a phase having “new juries . . . decid[ing] the individual liability and compensatory 
damages claims for each class member . . . .”). 
290. Amchem Prods., Inc. v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 591, 597, 626 (1997); see also Ortiz v. 
Fibreboard Corp., 527 U.S. 815, 852 n.30 (1999). 
291. Cf. Carrera v. Bayer Corp., 727 F.3d 300, 307 (3d Cir. 2013) (requiring the ascertainability 
of the class members because otherwise “individualized fact-finding or mini-trials will be required 
to prove class membership”). 
292. Sitkoff, supra note 19, at 652. 
293. See supra section II.B.2. 
294. Joel C. Dobris, Why Five? The Strange, Magnetic, and Mesmerizing Affect of the Five 
Percent Unitrust and Spending Rate on Settlors, Their Advisors, and Retirees, 40 REAL PROP. 
PROB. & TR. J. 39, 42 (2005) (citing James P. Garland, The Problems With Unitrusts, 1 J. PRIV. 
PORTFOLIO MGMT. 35 (1999)). 
295. Id. at 47 (“Two statutory solutions currently apply when traditional allocation rules fail. One 
solution is to give the trustee the power to reallocate or adjust receipts. The other is the unitrust.”). 
296. It should be noted that while a unitrust is typically the choice of the settlor, some states 
permit a trust lacking such terms to operate as a unitrust. See, e.g., 12 DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 12, 
§ 3527(b)(1) (West 2016) (providing for conversion of a trust to a unitrust).  
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In general, courts have been resistant to the type of recharacterization 
of shares in the managed property permitted by trust law.297 Such “fluid 
recovery” procedures raise the risk that uninjured persons will collect at 
the expense of those injured, or that some class members may receive a 
windfall.298 However, most of this resistance has arisen in appellate 
courts that have focused on preserving individual autonomy over the 
claim.299 District courts, on the other hand, which must address 
distributional issues head on, have been open to the recharacterization of 
claims for fairness and efficiency purposes.300 For example, courts have 
historically used bifurcation procedures in antitrust and securities fraud 
class actions, often assessing a “lump sum” award at the end of the first 
(liability) phase301 and then using “mechanical formulae” to distribute 
damages at the second (damages) phase.302 Such a bifurcated, 
mechanical procedure mirrors the fairness and efficiency advantages of 
the unitrust. 
                                                     
297. See McLaughlin v. Am. Tobacco Co., 522 F.3d 215, 231 (2d Cir. 2008), overruled on other 
grounds sub nom, Bridge v. Phoenix Bond & Indem. Co., 553 U.S. 639 (2008) (“‘[F]luid recovery’ 
has been forbidden in this circuit.”). 
298. See 3 RUBENSTEIN, supra note 289, § 10:20, at 527 (discussing criticism against fluid 
recovery that “it would result in a windfall to nonmembers of the class”); Campos, Proof, supra 
note 24, at 788–96 (discussing this concern). It is worth noting that the term “fluid recovery” is 
sometimes used to refer to “the entire procedure of classwide calculation of damages and 
distribution of the aggregate amount of any unclaimed balance thereof to injured class members or 
to others under cy pres notions or other doctrines.” Id. § 10:17, at 517 n.7. However, “fluid 
recovery” procedures typically refer more narrowly to procedures in which “a court awards 
compensation to a group that approximates the original group that suffered harm. For example, if a 
taxicab operator overcharges its customers, a fluid recovery might involve a court ordering the 
operator to offer discounts to its customers in the future.” Joshua P. Davis, Eric L. Cramer & Caitlin 
V. May, The Puzzle of Class Actions with Uninjured Members, 82 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 858, 877 
(2014) (citations omitted) (emphasis added).  
299. See supra section II.A.4 (discussing due process objections to class actions with no opt-out 
rights). 
300. See Lahav, supra note 13, at 575 (noting that concerns with preserving autonomy over a 
claim “dominates the Supreme Court’s jurisprudence, an equality principle is emerging at the 
district court level,” with district courts “using informal procedures to facilitate settlements of mass 
tort cases” (emphasis in original)).  
301. See 6 WILLIAM B. RUBENSTEIN ET AL., NEWBERG ON CLASS ACTIONS § 18:54 (4th ed. 2002) 
(discussing the use of such bifurcation procedures in antitrust class actions, in which “a lump sum 
damage award” is assessed against the defendant after liability is established); 7 WILLIAM B. 
RUBENSTEIN ET AL., NEWBERG ON CLASS ACTIONS § 22:72 (4th ed. 2002) (noting that such 
procedures are used in securities class actions). 
302. 6 RUBENSTEIN, supra note 301, § 18:53 (“Class proof of damages, either by an aggregate 
lump sum award to the class as a whole or by application of mechanical formulae or statistical 
methods to individual class members’ claims, has received approval in several antitrust 
cases . . . .”); 7 RUBENSTEIN, supra note 301, § 22:65 (“Determination of damages sustained by 
individual class members in securities class action suits is often a mechanical task involving the 
administration of a formula . . . .”). 
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Bifurcation and mechanical distribution procedures can be used to 
deal with the special concerns with fairness raised in Amchem. In 
Amchem, the Court expressed a concern that those presently injured 
would induce the class attorney to bias any class action settlement in 
their favor over the interests of the futures.303 Accordingly, an issue class 
action would allow class members with “present” claims to directly bias 
any proceeds in their favor, at the expense of class members who have 
“future” claims that have not yet accrued. 
A court can avoid such biasing by relying upon objective methods of 
determining the damages for each class member. For example, a court 
can base damages on a schedule that closely resembles the schedules 
used to pay benefits in Medicare or in workers’ compensation 
schemes.304 The use of such damage scheduling would allow for the 
distribution of proceeds free from the influence of any party. Moreover, 
the schedule can be adjusted by the court to avoid the exhaustion of 
funds by earlier claimants. 
Finally, unlike in the trust context, class actions can take advantage of 
the “numerosity” of the class members by using random sampling to 
determine claim values for class members.305 Random sampling can 
provide “outcome equality” because “[s]ampling and similar innovative 
procedures . . . extrapolat[e] results of sample trials to the rest of the 
plaintiff population,” free of any of the selection biases produced by a 
nonrandom sample.306 Moreover, sampling reduces costs by limiting the 
number of claims actually litigated. Such sampling can be, and has been, 
deployed in a bifurcation procedure.307 Although the Supreme Court has 
recently disapproved of such “Trial by Formula” procedures in class 
actions,308 the trust model suggests that they should be encouraged, not 
discouraged, by courts. 
                                                     
303. Amchem Prods., Inc. v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 591, 626 (1997) (noting the present’s preference 
for “generous immediate payments” as compared to the future’s preference for “an ample, inflation-
protected fund for the future”). 
304. See Campos, Mass Torts, supra note 24, at 1105–06 (discussing this possibility); David 
Rosenberg, Of End Games and Openings in Mass Tort Litigation: Lessons from a Special Master, 
69 B.U. L. REV. 695, 695 (1989) (noting and praising use of damage scheduling in mass tort cases, 
“similar to those created by statute for workers’ compensation programs”). 
305. FED. R. CIV. P. 23(a)(1) (requiring, for class certification purposes, that “the class is so 
numerous that joinder of all members is impracticable . . . .”). 
306. Lahav, supra note 13, at 578; see also D. James Greiner, Causal Inference in Civil Rights 
Cases, 122 HARV. L. REV. 533, 563 (2008) (noting that “[r]andom assignment assures that, in the 
absence of bad luck, units who receive one treatment are not systematically different from those 
who receive the other treatment.”). 
307. See Hilao v. Estate of Marcos, 103 F.3d 767, 782–87 (9th Cir. 1996).  
308. See Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 564 U.S. 338, 341 (2011). 
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III. EXTENSIONS OF THE MODEL 
The previous Part used a trust model of the class action to criticize the 
insistence under current law on opt-out rights and class cohesion in class 
actions involving damage claims. This Part extends the model to address 
other controversial issues in class action law. 
A. Ascertainability 
Recently, some federal courts have required the ascertainability of 
class members in class actions certified under Rule 23(b)(3).309 In 
Carrera v. Bayer Corp.,310 for example, the Third Circuit reviewed a 
consumer class action that asserted claims that the defendant 
fraudulently marketed diet pills.311 However, the named representatives 
could not ascertain the identity of every class member because the class 
members did not purchase the pills directly from the defendant, and class 
members were “unlikely to have documentary proof of purchase,” such 
as receipts.312 
The Third Circuit vacated the class action, concluding that the 
ascertainability of each class member was required because, among 
other things, “it eliminates serious administrative burdens that are 
incongruous with the efficiencies expected in a class action by insisting 
on easy identification of class members.”313 Moreover, requiring 
ascertainability would protect the rights of both the plaintiffs and the 
defendants.314 Although the Third Circuit has softened its stance on 
ascertainability somewhat,315 the Supreme Court has recently decided 
two class action cases which raised, without deciding, similar issues of 
ascertainability, focusing on situations where the class may “contain[] 
                                                     
309. Carrera v. Bayer Corp., 727 F.3d 300, 307 (3d Cir. 2013) (noting that “[a]scertainability 
mandates a rigorous approach at the outset because of the key roles it plays as part of a Rule 
23(b)(3) class action lawsuit”). But see Mullins v. Direct Digital, LLC, 795 F.3d 654, 657–58 (7th 
Cir. 2015) (declining to follow Bayer and impose such a “heightened ascertainability requirement”). 
310. 727 F.3d 300 (3d Cir. 2013). 
311. Id. at 303–04. 
312. Id. at 304. 
313. Id. at 306 (quoting Marcus v. BMW of N. Am., LLC, 687 F.3d 583, 593 (3d Cir. 2012)). 
314. Id. 
315. See Byrd v. Aaron’s Inc., 784 F.3d 154, 163 (3d Cir. 2015) (concluding that the 
ascertainability requirement “does not mean that a plaintiff must be able to identify all class 
members at class certification—instead, a plaintiff need only show that ‘class members can be 
identified’” (quoting Carrera, 727 F.3d at 308 n.2)). Indeed, the Third Circuit’s decision in Byrd 
brings the court’s ascertainability requirement closer to the ex post ascertainability requirement 
proposed here. 
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hundreds of members who were not injured and have no legal right to 
any damages.”316 
The trust model of the class action demonstrates that such an 
ascertainability requirement is harmful. The trust model of the class 
action shows that the class action and the trust are commonly used when 
the recipients cannot invest in the managed property at the right scale. In 
the class action context, this problem of scale is caused in large part by 
the fact that the class members must incur significant transaction costs in 
acting collectively to exploit economies of scale. One such transaction 
cost is the search costs associated with identifying who the other class 
members are, as is especially true in small claims litigation. Thus, 
requiring the ascertainability of the class members at the outset would 
foreclose the use of the class action in many appropriate settings. 
Here trust law is particularly instructive. Trust law also requires “a 
beneficiary who is definitely ascertainable,” but “[i]t is not 
necessary . . . that the beneficiary should be known at the time of the 
creation of the trust.”317 Instead, the beneficiary only needs to be 
“ascertainable within the period of the rule against perpetuities.”318 One 
reason is that the settlor may want to protect future interests who, 
because of their lack of existence, cannot possibly dispose of the res for 
their own benefit. Nevertheless, trust law does require some ex post 
ascertainability so that the beneficiary does receive the benefits of trust 
                                                     
316. See John Elwood, Relist Watch, SCOTUSBLOG (June 5, 2015, 10:32 AM), 
http://www.scotusblog.com/2015/06/relist-watch-65/ [https://perma.cc/2ZJM-85QK] (explaining 
that Tyson Foods, Inc. v. Bouaphakeo, __ U.S. __, 136 S. Ct. 1036 (2016), granted certiorari on 
issue of “[w]hether a class action may be certified or maintained under Rule 23(b)(3), or a collective 
action certified or maintained under the Fair Labor Standards Act, when the class contains hundreds 
of members who were not injured and have no legal right to any damages”); John Elwood, Relist 
Watch, SCOTUSBLOG (May 1, 2015, 12:19 PM), http://www.scotusblog.com/2015/05/relist-watch-
61/ [https://perma.cc/CJ9C-Q9YJ ] (explaining that Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins, __ U.S. __, 135 S. Ct. 
1892 (2015), granted certiorari on issue of “[w]hether Congress may confer Article III standing 
upon a plaintiff who suffers no concrete harm, and who therefore could not otherwise invoke the 
jurisdiction of a federal court, by authorizing a private right of action based on a bare violation of a 
federal statute”).  
The Supreme Court recently decided both decisions without discussing the ascertainability 
requirement. See Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins, __U.S. __, 136 S. Ct. 1540 (2015); Tyson Foods, Inc. v. 
Bouaphakeo, ___U.S. __, 136 S. Ct. 1036 (2015). However, in Tyson, the Court did suggest that the 
members need not be ascertained prior to distribution of any award recovered at trial, which would 
be consistent with the proposal here. See Tyson, 136 S. Ct. at 1050 (affirming certification of class 
action but remanding on issue of whether there exists a method to identify injured class members).  
317. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 112 & cmt. a (AM. LAW INST. 1959). 
318. Id. § 112; see also Hansmann & Mattei, supra note 19, at 464 (“Subject to the rule against 
perpetuities, the common law permits the beneficial interest in a trust to shift among individuals 
over time, and these shifts may be conditional upon a wide variety of contingencies.”). 
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management.319 Accordingly, such a relaxed ex post ascertainability 
requirement allows the settlor to protect the interests of a particularly 
vulnerable class of individuals.320 
The same ex post ascertainability requirement can easily be 
transported into the class action through the use of bifurcation 
procedures. Using such a procedure would permit the class attorney to 
develop the claims for the inchoate class, allowing the class members to 
reap the benefit of collective investment without incurring the costs of 
searching for the individual class members. In fact, the small claims 
plaintiff is particularly analogous to a future interest insofar as neither 
would do any investment in the absence of collective management by a 
manager. 
Moreover, like the relaxed ex post ascertainability requirement in 
trust law, some form of ascertainability of the class members would be 
required ex post after liability has been established to allow the class 
members to individually benefit from the class action. Allowing ex post 
ascertainability would also allow the class attorney to avoid the costs of 
identification in establishing liability and could push some of the costs to 
the class members themselves. Moreover, and in response to the 
Supreme Court’s recent concerns, ex post ascertainability would prevent 
uninjured parties from recovering. Finally, ex post ascertainability would 
not be as urgent in the class action context because, unlike in the trust 
context, the class members would have already received the ex ante 
benefit of the deterrence provided by the claims. The beneficiaries’ 
interests in the res do not have an analogous ex ante component. 
B. Settlement Pressure 
Federal courts have also expressed concern that the class action places 
undue pressure on the defendant to settle, allowing “plaintiffs to extort 
large settlements from defendants for meritless claims.”321 This concern 
with “blackmail settlements” is not new322 and has been used to justify 
restrictions on the use of class actions. For example, courts concerned 
                                                     
319. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 44 (AM. LAW INST. 2001) (requiring a “definite 
beneficiary”); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 112 (AM. LAW INST. 1959) (same). 
320. Cf. HESS ET AL., supra note 32, § 168 (noting that “[t]rusts for those of limited capacities are 
especially useful and desirable because of their inability to act for themselves,” citing, among 
others, minors) 
321. Halliburton Co. v. Erica P. John Fund, Inc., __ U.S. __, 134 S. Ct. 2398, 2413 (2014).  
322. See, e.g., HENRY J. FRIENDLY, FEDERAL JURISDICTION: A GENERAL VIEW 120 (1973) 
(discussing “blackmail settlements” in class actions); see also Hay & Rosenberg, supra note 3, at 
1378 & n.3 (citing Judge Friendly and discussing literature on blackmail settlements).  
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with blackmail settlements have concluded that a “rigorous analysis” of 
each of the class requirements is required, including a review of the 
merits to the extent that they overlap with other class certification 
requirements.323 
Admittedly, there is no analogue to the defendant in the trust. 
However, the trust model strongly suggests that concern with settlement 
pressure is misplaced because the settlement pressure created by the 
class action is a feature, not a bug. As the model shows, the class action 
is used to alleviate a problem of scale suffered by the class members. 
Because the interests of the class members are divided, they cannot 
invest in common issues at the appropriate scale. In contrast, the 
defendant owns the entire liability associated with any common issue, 
and thus does not suffer from a problem of scale. Accordingly, the 
concern with settlement pressure does not unfairly treat the interests of 
the defendant. Instead, it ensures fairness by leveling the playing field.324 
Indeed, empirical evidence shows that so-called “blackmail settlements” 
rarely, if ever, occur.325 
C. Cy Pres Distribution 
The trust model is also instructive in addressing cy pres awards in 
class actions. Cy pres awards themselves are derived from the law of 
charitable trusts326 and permit a court to “direct the application of the 
property . . . to [a] charitable purpose” within the intention of the settlor 
if “it is or becomes impossible . . . to carry out” the particular charitable 
                                                     
323. See In re New Motor Vehicles Canadian Exp. Antitrust Litig., 522 F.3d 6, 8, 17, 28 (1st Cir. 
2008) (concluding that a review of the plaintiff’s “novel and complex” theory of injury was 
necessary to avoid “a doubtful class certification” that puts undue pressure on the defendants to 
settle); In re Initial Pub. Offerings Sec. Litig., 471 F.3d 24, 38 n.9 (2d Cir. 2006) (permitting court 
to review merits when it overlapped with the predominance requirement, noting that such evidence 
does not prejudice the defendant because “[e]very class action defendant wants its evidence 
disputing Rule 23 requirements considered in order to try to fend off the enormous settlement 
pressure often arising from certification”); David Marcus, Some Realism About Mass Torts, 75 U. 
CHI. L. REV. 1949, 1955 (2008) (“Courts tempted to deny class certification to guard against 
settlement pressure in anemic cases have to determine that the case is indeed anemic and not one 
that merits a settlement.”). 
324. Campos, Proof, supra note 24, at 777–85. 
325. See Charles Silver, “We’re Scared to Death”: Class Certification and Blackmail, 78 N.Y.U. 
L. REV. 1357, 1359 (2003) (noting that “[e]mpirical researchers . . . dispute the blackmail claim”). 
326. See In re Pharm. Indus. Average Wholesale Price Litig., 588 F.3d 24, 33 (1st Cir. 2009) 
(using cy pres doctrine to justify the use of a fluid recovery procedure); 4 RUBENSTEIN , supra note 
212, § 11:20 (noting that the “disposition of funds that have not been individually distributed, by 
distributing them for the next best use which is for indirect class benefit, has been approved under 
the equitable power of courts in various cases under the analogous cy pres doctrine”).  
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purpose the settlor intended.327 Indeed, the invocation of the cy pres 
doctrine in the class action context strongly suggests that a number of 
courts already implicitly use a trust model of the class action. 
In the class action context, cy pres awards are typically used when a 
portion of any recovery goes unclaimed or class members cannot be 
identified.328 Cy pres issues tend to arise in small claims litigation, 
where in many such cases, “the amount of damages that each class 
member can expect to recover is probably too small even to warrant the 
bother, slight as it may be, of submitting a proof of claim in the class 
action proceeding.”329 Cy pres awards typically go to a charity.330 
Ironically, a trust model of the class action suggests that cy pres 
awards to a private third party like a charity may, in many 
circumstances, be inappropriate in the class action context because of the 
harmful effects they may have on deterrence and compensation.331 
Under the trust model, the class action solves a problem of scale by 
assigning control over the claims and incentivizing the class attorney to 
maximize the total return on those claims. Accordingly, cy pres 
distribution may be harmful to the extent that it disrupts this solution. 
For example, class counsel may have a relationship with the receiving 
charity and thus use her efforts to shift funds to the charity rather than to 
the class members.332 Deterrence may be maintained but the 
compensation of the class members would be diminished. 
Cy pres awards can also have harmful effects on the other parties 
involved in the class action. For example, the court’s relationship to a 
receiving charity may cause an undue amount of proceeds to go to the 
charity or result in bias against the defendant to increase the amount 
recoverable for the charity.333 In addition, the defendant’s relationship to 
the receiving charity may result in benefits to the defendant, such as 
                                                     
327. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 67 (AM. LAW INST. 2003); see also RESTATEMENT 
(SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 399 (AM. LAW INST. 1959). 
328. See 4 RUBENSTEIN, supra note 212, § 11:20 (noting that the “disposition of funds that have 
not been individually distributed, by distributing them for the next best use which is for indirect 
class benefit, has been approved under the equitable power of courts in various cases under the 
analogous cy pres doctrine”); In re Average Wholesale Price Litig., 588 F.3d at 33 (using cy pres 
doctrine to justify the use of a fluid recovery procedure).  
329. Hughes v. Kore of Ind. Enter., Inc., 731 F.3d 672, 675 (7th Cir. 2013). 
330. Rhonda Wasserman, Cy Pres in Class Action Settlements, 88 S. CAL. L. REV. 97, 111–14 
(2014). 
331. I thank Martha Minow for clarifying my thoughts on this issue. 
332. Wasserman, supra note 330, at 122–24. 
333. Id. at 124–25 (2014) (discussing risk of “the appearance of [] impropriety”). 
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reputational benefits, that dull the deterrence provided by the 
litigation.334 
Accordingly, the trust model suggests that, in considering cy pres 
awards, courts should choose a third party for distribution that inherently 
has no relationship with the parties. For example, the court could assign 
unclaimed funds to future plaintiffs in the form of price reductions, or to 
the state or United States Treasury through escheat procedures.335 
CONCLUSION 
Throughout this Article I have analogized the class action to the trust, 
using trust law as a guide in addressing a number of issues in the law of 
class actions. In the course of making the analogy, I identified a 
problem—the problem of scale—that justifies the use of the class action 
and the trust and explains why they are used despite the potential for 
agency costs. The scale benefits of the separation of ownership and 
control has been a central focus of the law of class actions,336 while trust 
scholarship has not given this benefit much consideration. This suggests 
that the class action can provide its own lessons for the trust. 
 
                                                     
334. Id. at 120–21; see also Marek v. Lane, __ U.S. __, 134 S. Ct. 8, 9 (2013) (noting in a 
statement respecting the denial of certiorari that “Facebook thus insulated itself from all class claims 
arising from the Beacon episode by paying plaintiffs’ counsel and the named plaintiffs some $3 
million and spending $6.5 million to set up a foundation in which it would play a major role”). 
335. 3 RUBENSTEIN, supra note 289, § 10:17, at 515–16; Wasserman, supra note 323, at 105–14 
(discussing “alternatives” to cy pres distribution); see also 28 U.S.C. §§ 2041 et seq. (2012) 
(permitting escheat of funds to the U.S. Treasury). 
336. ALI, PRINCIPLES, supra note 12, § 1.02 cmt. a (“The literature on aggregate proceedings is 
enormous. Much of it . . . focus[es] on matters like economies of scale and opportunistic behavior 
that are common to all [such proceedings].”). 
